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Abstract:	   In	  his	  Theory	  of	  Public	  Finance	   (1959),	  Musgrave	   invented	  the	  concept	  of	  merit	  wants	  to	  describe	  public	  wants	  that	  are	  satisfied	  by	  goods	  provided	  by	  the	  government	  in	  violation	   of	   the	   principle	   of	   consumer	   sovereignty.	   Starting	   from	   Musgrave’s	   mature	  discussion	   (1987),	   I	   construct	   two	   categories	   to	   classify	   the	   explanations	   of	  merit	   goods.	  The	  first	  strand	  of	  thought	  attempts	  to	  justify	  merit	  goods	  within	  New	  welfare	  economics,	  by	   modifying	   its	   assumptions	   to	   accommodate	   irrationality,	   uncertainty,	   lack	   of	  information,	   and	   psychic	   externalities.	   The	   second	   category	   encompasses	   more	   radical	  departures	   from	  consumer	  sovereignty,	  drawn	   from	  philosophical	   critiques	  of	  economics.	  In	  the	  third	  part	  of	  the	  paper,	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  two	  strands	  might	  be	  represented	  by	  a	  non-­‐‑individualistic	   social	   welfare	   function.	   I	   also	   show	   how	   this	   solution	   echoes	   Musgrave’s	  (1937)	   early	   views	   on	   public	   expenditures	   before	   he	   coined	   the	   concept	   of	  merit	  wants.	  From	  an	  historical	  perspective,	   the	   survival	  of	   the	   concept	  highlights	   the	  persistence	  of	   a	  social	  point	  of	  view	  in	  welfare	  economics.	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INTRODUCTION	  
The	   concept	   of	   merit	   wants	   was	   invented	   by	   the	   German-­‐‑born	   American	   economist	  Richard	  A.	  Musgrave	  for	  his	  Theory	  of	  Public	  Finance	  (1959).	  In	  a	  convoluted	  way,	  he	  meant	  to	   say	   that	   some	  human	  needs	  were	  of	   such	   importance	   that	   they	  merited	   governmental	  support	  in	  the	  form	  of	  in-­‐‑kind	  distribution	  of	  specific	  goods	  –	  merit	  goods	  –	  such	  as	  housing	  for	   the	   poor,	   school	   lunches,	   and	   healthcare.	   Musgrave	   argued	   that	   social	   goods	   –	   or	  collective,	  or	  public	  goods	  as	  they	  are	  often	  called	  –	  had	  to	  be	  provided	  by	  the	  government	  because	  they	  were	  technically	  non-­‐‑excludable.	  This	  feature	  would	  lead	  selfish	  individuals	  to	  free	  ride	  if	  the	  goods	  were	  allocated	  by	  the	  market.	  Yet,	  merit	  goods	  evaded	  this	  technical	  market-­‐‑failure	  logic.	  Musgrave	  (1959)	  claimed	  that	  “a	  different	  type	  of	  intervention	  occurs	  where	  public	  policy	  aims	  at	  an	  allocation	  of	  resources	  which	  deviates	  from	  that	  reflected	  by	  consumer	   sovereignty.”	   In	   his	   Theory,	   he	   conceptualized	   the	   economic	   functions	   of	   the	  government	   as	   being	   in	   three	   branches:	   allocation,	   distribution,	   and	   stabilization.	   The	  distribution	   branch	   would	   redistribute	   income	   and	   wealth	   to	   the	   level	   desired	   by	   the	  citizens	   in	   a	   democracy.	   The	   allocation	   branch	   would	   provide	   social	   goods	   in	   line	   with	  individual	   preferences.	  Musgrave	   (1957)	  noted	   that	   transfers	   in	   kind	   such	   as	   elementary	  education	  pose	  a	  problem	  to	  this	  branch	  separation	  because	  they	   involve	  a	  redistribution	  motive	   with	   a	   decision	   as	   to	   what	   the	   resources	   would	   be	   used	   for.	   These	   merit	   wants	  involve	  a	  paternalistic	  intervention	  that	  does	  not	  respect	  consumer	  sovereignty.	  
The	   paternalistic	   nature	   of	   merit	   goods	   led	   many	   economists	   to	   repudiate	   the	  concept.	   James	   M.	   Buchanan	   (1960)	   rejected	   the	   idea	   of	   a	   separate	   distribution	   branch	  which	  did	  not	  reflect	  individual	  preferences.	  From	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  the	  individuals,	  merit	  
	   3	  
goods	  were	   imposed	   by	   the	   government	   and	   thereby	   unacceptable	   for	   Buchanan	   (1960)	  who	   preferred	   to	   use	   the	   concept	   of	   externality	   to	   conceptualize	   any	   form	   of	  interdependency.	   Charles	   E.	   McLure,	   a	   former	   student	   of	   Musgrave’s,	   drove	   the	   point	  further:	  “merit	  wants,	  as	  Musgrave	  defines	  them,	  have	  no	  place	  in	  a	  normative	  theory	  of	  the	  public	   household	   based	   upon	   individual	   preferences”	   (McLure	   1968,	   474).	   Some	   of	   the	  policies	  advocated	  by	  Musgrave	  under	  the	  label	  of	  merit	  wants	  are	  “prohibited	  by	  the	  ethic	  of	   the	   new	   welfare	   economics	   which	   Musgrave	   adopts”	   (ibid.,	  479).	   McLure	   argued	   that	  they	  constituted	  “a	  normatively	  empty	  box.”	  Because	  of	   this	  methodological	  problem,	  and	  also	  because	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  concept	  is	  ambiguous,	  it	  has	  not	  enjoyed	  the	  popularity	  of	  the	   concept	   of	   public	   good.	   As	   one	   can	   see	   in	   Figure	   1,	   the	   concept	   of	   public	   goods,	   or	  collective	  goods,	  or	  social	  goods	  appears	  more	  frequently	  in	  scientific	  articles	  than	  that	  of	  merit	  wants	  or	  merit	  goods.	  Since	  both	  concepts	  were	  defined	  at	  about	  the	  same	  time	  in	  the	  1950s,	   we	   can	   provisionally	   conclude	   that,	   relative	   to	   the	   concept	   of	   public	   goods,	   the	  concept	  of	  merit	  goods	  failed	  to	  achieve	  mainstream	  appeal	  in	  economics.	  
	   In	   spite	   of	   that,	   the	   concept	   of	  merit	   goods	   should	   be	   appealing	   to	   the	   student	   of	  economics	   for	   at	   least	   two	   reasons.	   The	   first	   is	   because	   merit	   goods	   are	   a	   widespread	  phenomenon.	   Everywhere	   in	   the	  western	  world,	   governments	   allocate	   goods	   that	   can	   be	  more	  accurately	   labeled	  as	  merit	   goods	   than	  as	  pure	  public	  goods	   (Fiorito	  and	  Kollintzas	  2004).	   Second,	   since	   the	   concept	   lies	   in	   an	   uncomfortable	   place	   on	   the	   frontier	   of	  economics,	   it	  provides	  a	  reason	  to	  study	  the	  normative	  foundations	  of	   the	  discipline.	  This	  can	  be	  done	  either	  by	  challenging	  some	  assumptions	  at	  the	  core	  of	  neoclassical	  theory,	  or,	  as	   Peggy	   Musgrave	   (2008,	   345)	   argued,	   by	   enlarging	   public	   economics	   to	   embrace	   the	  neighboring	  disciplines	  of	  sociology,	  political	  science,	  and	  ethics.	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Figure	  1:	  The	  relative	  failure	  of	  merit	  wants	  
My	  goal	  in	  this	  paper	  is	  to	  review	  the	  literature	  on	  the	  justification	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  merit	   goods	   by	   putting	   its	   normative	   problem	   into	   historical	   perspective.	   The	   different	  bearings	  on	  the	  concept	  reflect	  and	  participate	  in	  the	  evolution	  of	  welfare	  economics	  from	  the	   1930s	   onwards.	   I	   show	   that	   the	   survival	   of	   the	   concept	   of	   merit	   goods	   through	   the	  decades	   highlights	   the	   difficulty	   of	   evading	   a	   social	   point	   of	   view	   in	   discussing	   collective	  welfare.	  	  
I	  organize	  the	  corpus	  in	  two	  categories:	  (1)	  the	  scholars	  who	  argue	  that	  merit	  goods	  can	   be	   provided	   by	   adjusting	   the	   assumptions	   of	   welfare	   economics;	   and	   (2)	   those	  who	  argue	  that	  merit	  wants	  capture	  socially	  non-­‐‑reducible	  responsibilities	  of	  the	  state,	  thereby	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departing	   more	   forcefully	   from	   the	   assumptions	   of	   welfare	   economics.2	   A	   discussion	   of	  these	  works	  is	  presented,	  respectively,	  in	  the	  first	  and	  second	  sections	  of	  the	  paper.	  In	  the	  third	   section,	   I	   ponder	   whether	   both	   these	   strands	   of	   argument	   can	   be	   adequately	  represented	  by	   the	  use	  of	  a	  non-­‐‑individualistic	  social	  welfare	   function	  (SWF).	   I	   show	  that	  the	  SWF	  representation	  is	  in	  line	  with	  Musgrave’s	  early	  conceptualization	  of	  social	  goods	  in	  his	  doctoral	  dissertation	  (1937).	  
***	  
In	  the	  rest	  of	  this	  introduction,	  I	  would	  like	  to	  relate	  my	  typology	  to	  Musgrave’s	  (1987)	  one	  and	   also	   to	   the	   principle	   of	   consumer	   sovereignty.	   Musgrave	   (1987)	   wrote	   an	   entry	   on	  merit	  goods	  for	  the	  first	  edition	  of	  the	  New	  Palgrave	  Dictionary	  of	  Economics.	  He	  identified	  five	   families	   of	   arguments	   in	   favor	   of	   merit	   goods.	   First,	   he	   remarked	   that	   some	  commentators	   have	   defended	   the	   view	   that	   merit	   goods	   could	   be	   provided	   in	   (i)	  “pathological	   cases”	   when	   individuals	   do	   not	   choose	   what	   is	   best	   for	   them,	   because	   the	  choice	   setting	   is	   imperfect	   or	   misleading,	   or	   because	   of	   time	   discounting.	   Second,	   it	   has	  been	  argued	  that	  individuals	  follow	  the	  (ii)	  “rule	  of	  fashion.”	  In	  this	  case,	  their	  behavior	  is	  influenced	  by	  that	  of	  others,	  or	  their	  choice	  might	  be	  influenced	  by	  advertisement.	  A	  third	  family	   of	   arguments	   has	   to	   do	  with	   (iii)	   “community	   preferences.”	  Musgrave	   argued	   that	  concern	  for	  the	  community	  might	  lead	  individuals	  to	  give	  budgetary	  support	  to	  some	  goods	  although	  their	  “own	  preferences	  speak	  otherwise”	  (Musgrave	  1987).	  He	  listed	  “concern	  for	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Due	  to	  space	  limitations,	  I	  select	  only	  important	  contributions	  to	  the	  debate	  on	  the	  normative	  status	  of	  merit	  goods.	  For	  surveys	  focusing	  on	  different	  aspects,	  see	  Andel	  (1984);	  Walsh	  (1987);	  Head	  (1991);	  Ver	  Eecke	  (2007);	  Clément	  et	  al.	  (2009);	  Sturn	  (2015).	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maintenance	  of	  historical	  sites,	  respect	  for	  national	  holidays,	  regard	  for	  environment	  or	  for	  learning	  and	  the	  arts”	  as	  examples	  of	  such	  merit	  goods.	  Fourth,	  moral	  considerations	  might	  lead	  individuals	  to	  favor	  (iv)	  “paternalism	  in	  distribution.”	  For	  instance,	  merit	  goods	  can	  be	  provided	  as	  ‘fair	  shares’	  of	  some	  basic	  goods	  to	  every	  citizen.	  Finally,	  Musgrave	  notes	  that	  some	  have	  justified	  merit	  goods	  by	  resorting	  to	  thicker	  conceptualization	  of	  the	  individuals	  by	   endowing	   them	   with	   (v)	   “multiple	   preferences,	   or	   higher	   values.”	   In	   terms	   of	   my	  typology,	  Musgrave’s	   first	   two	   families	   of	   arguments	   fall	   into	  my	   first	   category.	  His	   third	  and	   fourth	   families	   compose	   my	   second	   category.	   His	   fifth	   family	   of	   arguments	   is	   a	  conceptual	  tool	  that	  has	  been	  used	  by	  scholars	  who	  sit	  on	  either	  side	  of	  my	  division.	  	  
Merit	  goods	  are	  associated	  with	  a	  negation	  of	  consumer	  sovereignty.	  Unsurprisingly,	  just	   as	   the	   concept	   of	  merit	   good	   is	   ambiguous,	   so	   is	   that	   of	   consumer	   sovereignty.	   The	  latter	   concept	   was	   popularized	   by	   the	   economist	   William	   Hutt	   in	   1936.	   He	   defined	   the	  consumer	   as	   “sovereign	   when,	   in	   his	   role	   of	   citizen,	   he	   has	   not	   delegated	   to	   political	  institutions	   for	   authoritarian	   use	   the	   power	   which	   he	   can	   exercise	   socially	   through	   his	  power	  to	  demand	  (or	  to	  refrain	  from	  demanding)”	  (Hutt	  1936,	  257).	  Consumer	  sovereignty	  appealed	   to	  Hutt,	  both	   for	  economic	  arguments	  of	  efficiency,	  and	  because	   it	   constituted	  a	  defense	  of	  freedom	  for	  its	  own	  sake.	  In	  a	  broader	  intellectual	  perspective,	  the	  concept	  is	  an	  adaptation	  of	  individual	  sovereignty,	  a	  key	  idea	  in	  classical	  liberalism.	  
In	  a	  reply	  to	  criticisms	  of	  his	  concept,	  Hutt	  (1940,	  66)	  reformulated	  it	  into	  a	  general	  principle	   of	   economics,	   as	   the	   science	   came	   to	   be	   defined	   by	   Robbins	   (1932).	   For	   Hutt,	  consumer	   sovereignty	   embodied	   “the	   controlling	   power	   exercised	   by	   free	   individuals,	   in	  choosing	   between	   ends,	   over	   the	   custodians	   of	   the	   community’s	   resources,	   when	   the	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resources	  by	  which	  those	  ends	  can	  be	  served	  are	  scarce.”	  In	  the	  New	  welfare	  economics,	  it	  came	   to	  be	  associated	  with	   the	   idea	   that	  only	   the	  preferences	  of	   rational	   individuals	  –	  as	  they	  outwardly	  express	   them	  –	  ought	   to	  count	   in	  evaluating	  social	  welfare.	  By	   the	  1950s,	  another	   semantic	   layer	   could	   be	   added	   in	   the	   American	   context.	   The	   ‘consumer	   is	   king’	  became	   the	   slogan	   for	   the	   mass	   consumption	   society.	   As	   the	   political	   context	   evolved,	  upholding	  consumer	  sovereignty	  came	  to	  stand	  for	  a	  defense	  of	  western	  democratic	  liberal	  values,	   in	  contrast	   to	  the	  so-­‐‑called	  democratic	  regimes	  of	   the	  East	  (Amadae	  2003,	  4).	   It	   is	  used	   for	   instance	   by	   Arrow	   (1951,	   30)	   to	   label	   two	   of	   his	   reasonable	   conditions	   for	   a	  democratic	   social	   choice.3	   In	   this	  paper,	   I	  will	   define	   consumer	   sovereignty	   as	   combining	  two	  dimensions:	  First,	  (A)	  the	  assumption	  that	  individuals	  make	  rational	  choices,	  that	  they	  are	  sovereign	  over	  their	  choices	  and	  know	  what	  is	  good	  for	  them;4	  second,	  (B)	  the	  principle	  that	   only,	   but	   all,	   individual	   preferences	   (or	   choices)	   ought	   to	   count	   in	   evaluating	   social	  welfare.5	  The	  latter	  principle	  entertains	  a	  very	  close	  relationship	  with	  Pareto	  optimality.	  It	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Namely,	  Condition	  2:	  ‘Positive	  association	  of	  social	  and	  individual	  values’	  and	  Condition	  4:	  ‘non-­‐‑imposition’	  of	  the	  SWF.	  
4	  As	  early	  as	  1934,	  Hutt	  assumed	  that	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  competitive	  equilibrium	  rested	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  consumers	  were	  rational.	  In	  the	  discussion	  on	  merit	  goods,	  the	  sovereign	  individual	  is	  conceived	  in	  welfarist	  and	  noncomparable	  utility	  terms,	  to	  use	  the	  expressions	  of	  Sen	  (1979).	  
5	  Note	  that	  the	  first	  dimension	  can	  be	  interpreted	  as	  positive,	  but	  the	  second	  one	  is	  resolutely	  normative.	  Desreumaux	  (2013)	  convincingly	  argues	  that	  consumer	  sovereignty	  is	  the	  central	  normative	  principle	  of	  (paretian)	  neoclassical	  economics.	  McLure	  (1990,	  179)	  gives	  a	  definition	  of	  consumer	  sovereignty	  very	  close	  to	  the	  one	  I	  use.	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entails	   that	   only	   Pareto-­‐‑improving	   policies	   are	   favorable.	   Otherwise,	   it	   would	  mean	   that	  some	  preferences	  are	  not	  respected	  in	  the	  social	  choice.	  
In	   relation	   to	   my	   typology	   of	   the	   literature,	   in	   the	   first	   category	   (section	   1),	   the	  attempts	  to	  justify	  merit	  goods	  do	  so	  by	  rejecting	  or	  modifying	  (A)	  –	  the	  first	  dimension	  of	  consumer	  sovereignty;	  in	  the	  second	  category	  (section	  2),	  the	  works	  reject	  (B)	  –	  the	  second	  part	  of	  the	  definition.	  
1.  THE	  MAINSTREAM	  APPROACH	  TO	  JUSTIFYING	  MERIT	  GOODS	  
Most	   of	   the	   papers	   that	   try	   to	   justify	   the	   concept	   of	  merit	  wants	   and	  more	   generally	   the	  provision	  of	  merit	  goods	  have	  done	  so	  without	  questioning	  the	  central	  normative	  precept	  of	  welfare	   economics,	   namely	   that	   only	   (and	   all)	   individual	   preferences	   ought	   to	   count	   in	  matters	   of	   social	   welfare.	   What	   I	   call	   the	   mainstream	   approach	   encompasses	   diverse	  attempts	  to	  qualify	  the	  actual	  sovereignty	  of	  consumers	  over	  some	  of	  their	  choices.	  These	  discussions	   have	   their	   root	   in	   cursory	   comments	   made	   by	   Musgrave	   himself	   when	   he	  coined	  the	  concept.	  First,	  he	  tried	  to	  minimize	  the	  extent	  of	  the	  phenomena	  by	  noting	  that	  apparent	  merit	  wants	  might	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  social	  wants	  (collective	  wants),	  or	  at	  least	  mixed	  cases	   (Musgrave	   1959,	   13,	   89).	   Then,	   he	   observed	   that	   “the	   basic	   doctrine	   of	   consumer	  sovereignty,	   finally,	   rests	   on	   the	   assumption	   of	   complete	  market	   knowledge	   and	   rational	  appraisal.”	   Yet,	   who	   could	   contest	   that	   the	   modern	   consumer	   is	   subjected	   to	   aggressive	  advertising,	  “screaming	  at	  him	  through	  the	  media	  of	  mass	  communication	  and	  designed	  to	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sway	   his	   choice	   rather	   than	   to	   give	   complete	   information”?6	   To	   Musgrave,	   this	   was	   “a	  source	  of	  distortion	  in	  the	  preferences	  structure	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  counteracted”	  (ibid.,	  14).	  
During	  the	  1960s,	  the	  concept	  of	  public	  good	  –	  or	  social	  good	  as	  Musgrave	  calls	  it	  –	  progressively	  acquired	  its	  standard	  definition	  as	  non-­‐‑rival	  and	  non-­‐‑excludable	  (Desmarais-­‐‑Tremblay	  2015b).	  Yet,	  for	  most	  of	  the	  decade,	  not	  much	  had	  been	  written	  on	  merit	  wants.	  The	  Australian	  economist	  John	  G.	  Head	  (1932–2010)	  was	  the	  first	  to	  launch	  a	  discussion	  on	  the	   status	   of	  merit	  wants	  within	   the	   new	   normative	   theory	   of	   public	   finance.	   He	   set	   out	  hoping	  to	  bring	  the	  concept	  into	  the	  familiar	  framework	  of	  Pigouvian	  or	  Keynesian	  theories	  of	   public	   policy.	   Head	   (1966)	   wrote	   his	   first	   paper	   on	   the	   topic	   in	   1965	   while	   he	   was	  visiting	   Musgrave	   at	   Princeton	   University	   (Head	   2009).	   He	   identified	   three	   underlying	  issues	   in	   merit	   wants:	   (i)	   preference	   distortion	   problems	   caused	   by	   uncertainty	   and	  irrationality;	   (ii)	  distributional	  problems	   inherent	   in	  Musgrave’s	   conceptual	   separation	  of	  allocation	  and	  distribution;	  and	  (iii)	  public	  goods	  (or	  social	  wants)	  problems.	  In	  his	  frontal	  attack	   on	   the	   concept,	   McLure	   (1968)	   rejected	   Head’s	   interpretation,	   which	   would	   have	  made	   the	   concept	   more	   acceptable	   to	   economists.	   He	   pushed	   the	   interpretation	   into	   a	  dilemma:	  the	  concept	  was	  either	  redundant	  –	  externalities	  would	  suffice	  –	  or	  unacceptable	  –	  it	  entailed	  a	  violation	  of	  individual	  preferences,	  which	  is	  what	  McLure	  thought	  Musgrave	  had	  in	  mind.	  The	  next	  year,	  Head	  (1969)	  replied	  to	  McLure’s	  attack	  and	  tried	  to	  refocus	  his	  argument.	   He	   argued	   that	   “[t]he	   central	   characteristic	   of	   a	   merit	   good	   is	   that	   many	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Galbraith’s	  (1958)	  essay	  had	  just	  been	  published.	  Musgrave	  did	  not	  refer	  to	  it,	  but	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  mass	  consumption	  society	  and	  its	  side	  effects	  must	  have	  been	  an	  obvious	  phenomenon	  to	  keen	  observers	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  decade.	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individuals	  are	  unable	   to	  evaluate	   the	  benefits	   correctly.	  The	  problem	   is	   therefore	  one	  of	  imperfect	   knowledge,	   broadly	   interpreted”	   (Head	   1969,	   214).	   Under	   this	   problem,	   he	  discerned	  two	  causes	  of	  incorrect	  preferences:	  ignorance	  and	  irrationality.	  	  
Meanwhile,	   in	   an	   important	   paper	   on	   public	   wants	   presented	   in	   1966,	   Musgrave	  made	   brief	   remarks	   on	   merit	   wants.	   More	   than	   ever,	   the	   concept	   appeared	   as	   an	  inconvenient	   residual	   in	   his	   theory	   of	   public	   allocation.	   Musgrave	   repeated	   his	   1959	  argument:	  Important	  cases	  such	  as	  education	  combine	  elements	  of	  merit	  and	  social	  goods.	  Their	  overdetermination	  thus	  reduces	  the	  necessity	  to	  clarify	  the	  merit	  nature.	  Moreover,	  since	  “the	  advantages	  of	  education	  are	  more	  evident	  to	  the	  informed	  than	  the	  uninformed”	  (Musgrave	   1959,	   13),	   compulsory	   education	   could	   be	   justified	   as	   a	   temporary	   learning	  process	  (Musgrave	  1969a,	  143).	  Although	  he	  acknowledged	  that	  “reconciliation	  must	  not	  be	  carried	  too	  far,”	  Musgrave	  presented	  “psychic	  externalities”	  as	  a	  way	  to	  justify	  merit	  wants	  of	  the	  in-­‐‑kind	  redistribution	  type.7	  Those	  externalities	  –	  different	  from	  the	  physical	  ones	  –	  are	   defined	   as	   interdependence	   between	   the	   individual	   utility	   functions	   (Culyer	   1971;	  Folkers	   1974).	   This	   conceptualization	   of	  merit	  wants	  was	   first	   suggested	  by	  Tiebout	   and	  Houston	   (1962)	   in	   a	   paper	   that	   presented	   a	   rationalized	   description	   of	   the	   plurality	   of	  government	   function	  at	   the	  metropolitan	   level.8	  The	   idea	   is	   simply	   that	   individuals	  might	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  In	  fact,	  as	  new	  individualistic	  models	  of	  redistribution	  appeared	  (Hochman	  and	  Rodgers	  1969;	  Pauly	  1970),	  Musgrave	  (1970)	  stressed	  that	  a	  sizable	  part	  of	  the	  redistribution	  of	  wealth	  and	  income	  could	  not	  be	  justified	  in	  such	  Pareto-­‐‑optimal	  ways.	  
8	  Charles	  M.	  Tiebout	  was	  a	  student	  of	  Musgrave’s	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Michigan	  in	  the	  1950s	  (Musgrave	  1999,	  158).	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voluntarily	   support	   in-­‐‑kind	   redistribution	   if	   they	   derive	   utility	   from	   the	   consumption	   of	  some	   specific	   goods	   by	   others.	   Thus,	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	   1960s,	   the	   table	   was	   set	   for	   a	  discussion	   of	   merit	   goods	   in	   terms	   that	   could	   potentially	   reconcile	   them	   with	   the	   New	  welfare	  economics	  –	  namely,	  uncertainty,	  information	  asymmetry,	  and	  other	  circumscribed	  cases	   of	   distorted	   preferences.	   Indeed,	   many	   papers	   followed	   this	   lead,	   most	   of	   them	  published	  in	  the	  German	  journal	  Finanzarchiv	  –	  Public	  Finance	  Analysis	  in	  which	  Musgrave	  (1957),	  Head	  (1966,	  1969)	  and	  McLure	  (1968)	  had	  made	  their	  seminal	  contributions	  to	  the	  debate.	  For	  instance,	  Auld	  and	  Bing	  (1971)	  maintained	  that	  merit	  goods	  could	  be	  conceived	  as	  relevant	   information	  about	   the	  characteristics	  of	  goods	   that	  markets	  do	  not	  provide	   to	  the	  customers	  and	  that	  should	  therefore	  be	  provided	  by	  the	  government.9	  Convinced	  of	  the	  importance	   of	   staying	   in	   line	   with	   the	   individualistic	   perspective,	   Mackscheidt	   (1974)	  argued	   that	   individuals,	   in	   a	   pragmatic	  move,	  might	   temporarily	   delegate	   their	   power	   of	  choice	  to	  their	  political	  representatives	  when	  information	  is	  more	  costly	  to	  obtain	  privately	  than	  through	  public	  authorities.	  
Another	  modeling	  approach	  to	  merit	  goods	  as	  correcting	  for	  imperfect	   information	  was	  provided	  by	  Sandmo	  (1983).	  Assuming	  von	  Neumann-­‐‑Morgenstern	  utility	  functions,	  he	  suggested	   that	   social	   welfare	   might	   be	   maximized	   using	   the	   social	   planners’	   probability	  distribution,	   rather	   than	   the	   less	   informed	   distributions	   of	   individual	   agents.	   Sandmo	  argued	   that	   respecting	   individual	   tastes	   (over	   state-­‐‑contingent	   commodities)	   was	   the	  essence	   of	   consumer	   sovereignty.	   His	   attempt	   to	   find	   an	   individualistic	   basis	   for	   merit	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Their	  analysis	  suffers	  from	  serious	  problems	  that	  have	  been	  pointed	  out	  by	  Ballentine	  (1972)	  and	  Braulke	  (1972).	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goods	   intervention	   fitted	   with	   the	   optimal	   taxation	   literature	   which	   flourished	   in	   public	  economics	  in	  the	  1980s.	  
The	  positivistic	   and	  behavioristic	   turn	  of	  welfare	  economics	   in	   the	   first	  half	   of	   the	  twentieth	   century,	   which	   had	   economists	   shying	   away	   from	   interpersonal	   comparisons,	  created	  tensions	  within	  welfare	  economics	  (Cooter	  and	  Rappoport	  1984).	  Economists	  came	  to	  realize	  that	  they	  could	  not	  draw	  many	  meaningful	  policy	  conclusions	  on	  those	  bases	  and	  thus	  many	  voices	  later	  emerged	  to	  criticize	  the	  thinness	  of	  the	  welfarist	  perspective.	  From	  a	  retrospective	   point	   of	   view,	   both	   the	   assumption	   of	   interdependent	   utility	   functions	   and	  that	   of	   distorted	   preferences	   can	   be	   seen	   as	   attempts	   to	   open	   up,	   or	   broaden,	   the	  conception	  of	  the	  individual	  in	  economics.	  The	  interdependence,	  or	  psychic	  externality,	  is	  a	  way	   to	   account	   for	   the	   fact	   that	   preferences	   are	   endogenous	   and	   that	   individuals	   have	  other-­‐‑regarding	   behavior,	   quite	   different	   from	   the	   homo	   œconomicus	   straw	   man.	   For	  instance,	  Sen’s	  (1977)	  early	  revival	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  sympathy	  was	  a	  step	  in	  that	  direction.	  Blatant	   cases	   of	   deviation	   from	   the	   standard	   rationality,	   regarding	   time	   consistency	   for	  instance,	  also	  called	  for	  a	  thicker	  individual.	  One	  way	  to	  achieve	  this	  is	  to	  reject	  the	  revealed	  preference	  conception	  and	  assume	  some	  degree	  of	  reflexivity	  on	  the	  part	  of	  individuals.	  As	  early	   as	   the	   1950s,	   Harsanyi	   (1955)	   had	   remarked	   that	   irrationality	   called	   for	   a	  qualification	  of	   consumer	  sovereignty.	  Moreover,	  he	  proposed	   to	  distinguish	  between	   the	  individual’s	   subjective	   preferences	   and	   her	   ethical	   preferences,	   which	   led	   Sen	   (1977)	   to	  argue	  that	  the	  moral	  judgments	  made	  by	  individuals	  reflected	  a	  meta-­‐‑ranking	  (a	  ranking	  of	  the	  different	  preference	  ranking	  of	  actions).	   In	  a	  similar	  vein,	  Basu	  (1976)	  asserted	  that	  a	  distinction	  between	  actual	  choices	  and	  retrospective	  choices	  could	  justify	  merit	  goods	  such	  as	  compulsory	  education.	  He	  identified	  three	  causes	  of	  discrepancy:	  (i)	  because	  the	  quality	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of	   the	   good	  might	   only	  be	   revealed	   through	   experience;	   (ii)	   because	   individuals	   discount	  time;	   (iii)	   and	   because	   their	   tastes	  might	   change	   over	   time.	   Basu	  maintained	   that	   Pareto	  optimality	  should	  be	  assessed	  on	  the	  more	  reflexive	  “retrospective	  choices.”10	  
Brennan	  and	  Lomasky	  (1983)	  present	  a	  convincing	  case	  for	  taking	  into	  account	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  institutional	  setting	  on	  the	  way	  in	  which	  individuals	  make	  choices.	  They	  argued	  that	   individuals	   choose	   according	   to	   a	  different	   set	   of	   preferences	   in	   a	  political	   context	   –	  called	   p-­‐‑preferences	   –	   than	   when	   buying	   commodities	   at	   the	   market	   following	   their	  m-­‐‑preferences.	  The	  political	  setting	  might	   lead	   individuals	   to	  vote	   for	   the	  provision	  of	  merit	  goods	  over	  and	  above	  their	  willingness	  to	  pay	  in	  the	  market	  for	  the	  same	  goods	  when	  they	  follow	   their	  m-­‐‑preferences.11	   Likewise,	   Cooter	   and	   Gordley	   (1995)	   develop	   a	   model	   to	  explain	  merit	   goods	   based	   on	  akrasia,	   in	  which	  majority	   voting	   reveals	   collectively	  more	  considerate	   judgments,	   because	   of	   the	   averaging	   effect,	   than	   from	   the	   impulsive	   acts	   of	  isolated	   individuals.	  More	   recently,	  Mann	   (2006)	  has	   synthesized	  and	  expanded	  on	   those	  arguments,	   basing	   his	   case	   for	   Pareto-­‐‑improving	   provision	   of	   some	   merit	   goods	   on	   (i)	  better	   information	   on	   the	   part	   of	   the	   government,	   (ii)	   the	   government’s	   capacity	   to	   help	  individuals	   mediate	   between	   market	   preferences	   and	   more	   reflexive	   ones,	   and	   (iii)	   the	  government’s	  responsibility	  to	  internalize	  psychological	  externalities.	  
With	   the	   resurgence	   of	   behavioral	   economics	   in	   the	   late	   1970s,	   new	   empirical	  evidence	   emerged	   to	   challenge	   the	   assumptions	   of	   standard	   economic	   rationality.	  While	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  For	  a	  similar	  position,	  see	  Burrows	  (1977,	  29).	  
11	  Similar	  ideas	  are	  also	  discussed	  by	  Head	  (1988).	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spreading	  to	  subfields	  such	  as	  public	  economics,	  it	  recently	  gave	  new	  life	  to	  the	  irrationality	  argument	  for	  merit	  goods.	  Sunstein	  and	  Thaler	  (2003)	  claim	  to	  have	  squared	  the	  circle	  of	  liberalism	   by	   directly	   influencing	   the	   individual’s	   choice	   setting,	   while	   at	   the	   same	   time	  preserving	  their	  freedom.	  They	  argue	  that	  some	  form	  of	  paternalism	  is	  inevitable,	  but	  that	  it	  needs	  not	  be	  coercive	  (Thaler	  and	  Sunstein	  2003).	  This	  led	  D’amico	  (2009)	  and	  Mann	  and	  Gairing	   (2012)	   to	   argue	   that	   this	   libertarian	   paternalism,	   based	   on	   new	   behavioral	  economics,	   could	   potentially	   reconcile	   merit	   goods	   with	   mainstream	   economics.12	   In	   a	  recent	   book,	   Alistair	   Munro	   (2009)	   brings	   the	   results	   of	   behavioral	   economics	   into	  resonance	   with	   public	   economics,	   in	   particular	   through	   the	   concept	   of	   merit	   wants,	   for	  which	  he	  provides	  a	  new	  formal	  definition.	  He	  defines	   individuals	  as	  merit	  worthy	   if	   they	  are	  not	  strongly	  rational,	  either	  because	  they	  are	  not	  even	  weakly	  rational,	  or	  because	  their	  preference	  ordering	  is	  not	  reflected	  in	  the	  social	  welfare	  function.	  An	  individual	  who	  is	  not	  weakly	   rational	   is	   bounded	   rational,	   which	   means	   either	   that	   she	   does	   not	   have	   a	  preference	  ordering	  over	  all	  social	  states,	  or	  that	  her	  preferences	  are	  frame	  dependent.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  revealed	  preferences	  might	  change	  depending	  on	  the	  context	  of	  the	  choice	  situation.13	  Historically,	  the	  revival	  of	  behavioral	  criticism	  emerged	  out	  of	  the	  breaking	  up	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  rationality	  paradigm	  of	  research	  in	  the	  social	  sciences.	  Yet,	   ironically,	  it	   is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  This	  lead	  is	  also	  followed	  in	  the	  surveys	  of	  Clément	  et	  al.	  (2009),	  Sturn	  (2015),	  and	  Kirchgässner	  (2015).	  
13	  For	  the	  formal	  definitions,	  see	  Munro	  (2009,	  6	  ff.).	  Following	  this	  definition,	  Munro	  provides	  in	  the	  seventh	  chapter	  of	  his	  book	  a	  review	  of	  the	  optimal	  taxation	  models	  of	  merit	  goods,	  especially	  the	  recent	  ones	  such	  as	  Racionero	  (2000)	  who	  follows	  in	  the	  footsteps	  of	  Sandmo	  (1983)	  by	  focusing	  on	  information	  provision.	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also	   an	   offspring	   of	   this	   very	   economical	   perspective	   on	   social	   life,	   and	   is	   gradually	  becoming	  part	  of	  mainstream	  economics	  (Erickson	  et	  al.	  2013;	  Davis	  2006,	  2008).	  	  
In	  sum,	  the	  subjective	  and	  behavioral	  notion	  of	  welfare	  implicit	  in	  the	  New	  welfare	  economics	  posed	  methodological	  problems	  to	  economists	  such	  as	  Musgrave,	  who	  wanted	  to	  study	   the	   allocative	   and	   distributional	   functions	   of	   the	   state	   in	   a	   comprehensive	   way.	  Economists	   who	   addressed	   this	   problem	   tried	   to	   qualify	   the	   standard	   conception	   of	  consumer	   sovereignty	  by	   conceding	   specific	   cases	   in	  which	   individuals	  were	  not	   the	  best	  judges	   of	   their	  welfare,	  without	   rejecting	   altogether	   the	   stronger	   normative	   precept	   that	  preferences	  –	  broadly	  understood	  –	  ought	  to	  be	  the	  norm	  for	  social	  welfare.	  In	  retrospect,	  the	   mainstream	   approach	   to	   merit	   goods	   is	   characterized	   by	   negative	   reasons	   for	  government	  interventions.	  This	  is	  a	  common	  feature	  of	  the	  market	  failure	  approach,	  which	  conceives	   the	   market	   as	   the	   baseline	   allocation	   mechanism,	   unless	   a	   problem	   is	  encountered.	  Thus,	  irrationality,	  psychic	  externalities,	  and	  information	  asymmetries	  can	  be	  added	   to	   the	   list	   of	   causes	   of	   failure,	   which	   already	   contained	   (physical)	   externalities,	  impossibility	  of	   exclusion,	  non-­‐‑rivalry	   in	   consumption,	  decreasing	  marginal	   cost,	   or	  more	  generally	  problems	  of	  appropriation.	  Furthermore,	  this	  negative	  approach	  is	  also	  a	  feature	  of	  the	  implicit	  representation	  of	  the	  person:	  the	  rational	  sovereign	  individual	  is	  now	  seen	  as	  subject	  to	  different	  biases	  and	  limited	  cognitive	  capabilities.	  
2.  A	  BIGGER	  CHALLENGE	  TO	  WELFARE	  ECONOMICS	  
In	   this	   section,	   I	   reconstruct	  my	   second	   category	   of	   the	   literature	   on	  merit	   goods,	  which	  departs	   more	   forcefully	   from	   welfare	   economics.	   Contrary	   to	   the	   previous	   section,	   the	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arguments	  put	  forward	  in	  the	  texts	  in	  this	  category	  are	  positive	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  do	  not	  rely	  on	  the	  market	  failure	  approach,	  but	  rather	  try	  to	  define	  what	  could	  be	  an	  “alternative	  norm”	   to	   consumer	   sovereignty	   (Musgrave	   1987)	   for	   rationalizing	   and	   justifying	   some	  public	  expenditures.	  Two	  related	  dimensions	  of	   the	  problem	  of	  consumer	  sovereignty	  are	  missing	  from	  the	  market-­‐‑failure	  explanation:	  the	  political	  and	  the	  ethical.	  Again,	  Musgrave	  hinted	   at	   those	   necessary	   aspects	   of	   a	   comprehensive	   and	   realistic	   theory	   in	   his	   early	  discussion.	   He	   expressed	   a	   “mild	   moralistic	   position”	   (Ver	   Eecke	   2007,	   6),	   without	  providing	   a	   philosophical	   argument:	   “A	   position	   of	   extreme	   individualism	   could	   demand	  that	  all	  merit	  wants	  be	  disallowed,	  but	  this	  is	  not	  a	  sensible	  view”	  (Musgrave	  1959,	  13).14	  As	  for	   the	   political	   dimension,	   he	   asserted	   the	   importance	   of	   leadership	   in	   the	   institutional	  context	   of	   a	   democratic	   community.	   In	   his	   second	   paper	   on	   the	   topic,	   Head	   (1969,	   224)	  observed	   that	   “Musgrave’s	   approach	  has	   some	   flavor	  of	   both	   the	   ethical	   and	   the	  political	  approaches.”	  He	  also	  acknowledged	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  merit	  goods	  requires	  an	  extension	  of	   the	  welfare	   framework	   beyond	   the	   Pareto	   approach	   (ibid.,	  225),	   but	   he	   did	   not	   follow	  this	  suggestion	  in	  his	  own	  justification	  attempts.15	  
In	   inventing	   the	   concept	  of	  merit	  wants,	  Musgrave	  may	  have	  been	   trying	   to	   find	  a	  compromise	   in	   favor	   of	   Gerhard	   Colm’s	   long-­‐‑standing	   opposition	   to	   the	   individual	  preference	   approach	   to	   public	   expenditures	   (Desmarais-­‐‑Tremblay	   2015a).	   According	   to	  Colm,	   this	   approach	   “overlook[s]	   the	   essentially	   political	   character	   of	   the	   budget	   process	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  In	  his	  review	  of	  the	  Theory	  of	  Public	  Finance,	  Wiseman	  (1960,	  266)	  noted	  that	  Musgrave	  failed	  to	  directly	  address	  the	  problems	  of	  political	  philosophy	  he	  raised.	  	  15	  The	  political	  dimension	  is	  also	  conceptualized	  by	  Pulsipher	  (1971);	  Folkers	  (1974);	  Mackscheidt	  (1974);	  Brennan	  and	  Lomasky	  (1983)	  and	  Rüffer	  (2007).	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and	  the	  essentially	  social	  nature	  of	  its	  objective”	  (Musgrave	  1959,	  87).	  Consequently,	  Colm	  regretted	   that	  Musgrave	   devoted	   so	  much	   attention	   to	   the	   individual	   benefit	   theory,	   but	  only	  “much	  briefer	  (and	  rather	  vague)”	  discussion	  to	  the	  “principles	  for	  determining”	  merit	  wants	  (Colm	  1960a,	  119).	   In	  Colm’s	  view,	   the	  public	   interest	  was	  a	  more	  “comprehensive	  and	  operational”	  guiding	  principle	  for	  the	  conduct	  of	  the	  different	  actors	  that	  compose	  the	  political	  process	  (leaders,	  bureaucrats,	  pressure	  groups,	  public	  opinion,	  voters,	  etc.)	  (Colm	  1960a,	   1960b,	   1965).	   Moreover,	   he	   claimed	   that	   the	   public	   interest	   also	   “serves	   as	   a	  criterion	  for	  the	  satisfaction	  of	  ‘merit	  wants’	  ”	  (Colm	  1960a,	  119).	  
The	  restrictions	  imposed	  by	  the	  New	  welfare	  economics	  on	  questions	  of	  distribution	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  too	  severe	  for	  a	  broad	  conceptualization	  of	  the	  role	  of	  the	  state	  in	  society	  (Backhouse	   and	   Nishizawa	   2010a).	   Trained	   as	   a	   philosopher,	   John	   Rawls	   developed	   a	  serious	  interest	  in	  economics	  in	  the	  1950s	  (Hawi	  2011).	  His	  Theory	  of	  Justice	  (1971)	  set	  in	  motion	   a	   discussion	   between	   philosophers	   and	   economists	   which	   allowed	   the	   latter	   to	  reflect	   on	   the	   normative	   basis	   of	   their	   science.	   Rawls	   accepted	   the	   challenge	   that	  economists	   were	   helpless	   to	   solve:	   how	   to	   build	   a	   substantial	   and	   consensual	   (or	  convincing)	   ethical	   view	   from	   sound	   premises	   that	   respected	   individual	   autonomy	   and	  could	   face	   the	   socioeconomic	   problems	   of	   postwar	   America.	   In	   his	   theory	   of	   justice	   as	  fairness,	   once	   the	   basic	   structure	   of	   society	   guarantees	   freedom	   to	   everyone,	   the	  institutions	  should	  be	  organized	  so	  as	  to	  maximize	  the	  welfare	  of	  the	  least-­‐‑well-­‐‑off	  citizen.	  To	   do	   so,	   certain	   interpersonal	   comparisons	   of	   welfare	   have	   to	   be	   accepted.	   Rawls’s	  objective	  basis	  of	   comparison	   is	   an	   index	  of	  primary	  goods,	  which	   include	  basic	   liberties,	  freedoms,	  opportunities,	   income	  and	  wealth,	  and	  social	  bases	  of	  self-­‐‑respect	  (Rawls	  1982,	  1971,	  90ff).	  Rawls’s	   inference	   that	   citizens	   in	   a	   just	   society	  might	   reasonably	   expect	   it	   to	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provide	   them	   with	   a	   basic	   level	   of	   such	   goods	   rests	   on	   an	   ethical	   thought	   experiment.	  According	   to	  Musgrave,	   the	  disinterested	  position	  behind	   the	  veil	  of	   ignorance	   influences	  the	   individual’s	  sovereignty	   to	  choose,	   leading	  her	   to	  more	  reasonable	   judgments	  on	  how	  the	  primary	  distribution	  should	  be	  made.	  Musgrave	   (1987)	  only	  hinted	  at	  a	   link	  between	  Rawls’s	  primary	  goods	  and	  his	  concept	  of	  merit	  goods.	  Recently,	  Ege	  and	  Igersheim	  (2010)	  have	  convincingly	  argued	  that	  some	  merit	  goods	  such	  as	  education	  and	  healthcare	  services	  should	  be	   included	   in	   the	   fourth	   type	  of	  primary	  goods	  considered	  by	  Rawls:	   income	  and	  wealth.	  Indeed,	  Rawls	  (2001,	  172)	  later	  remarked	  that	  the	  citizens’	  reasonable	  expectations	  of	  government	  services	  included	  many	  “personal	  goods	  and	  services”	  that	  could	  be	  labeled	  as	  merit	  goods.	  	  
Just	   before	  Rawls	  published	  his	  Theory,	   James	  Tobin	   (1970)	  delivered	   a	   lecture	   in	  which	  he	  called	  for	  limiting	  inequalities	  through	  “specific	  egalitarianism.”	  Tobin	  argued	  that	  every	  citizen	  should	  be	  assured	  a	  minimum	  quantity	  of	  certain	  scarce	  goods	  –	  such	  as	  basic	  foods	   in	   wartime,	   medical	   care,	   basic	   shelter.	   Musgrave	   (1987)	   referred	   to	   this	   view	   as	  “categorical	   equity”	   and	  argued	   that	   it	   constituted	   an	   idea	  of	   redistribution	   akin	   to	  merit	  goods.	  Although	  Tobin	  never	  used	  (in	  print)	   the	  concept	  of	  categorical	  equity,	  nor	   that	  of	  merit	   goods,	   Musgrave	   considered	   that	   Tobin’s	   plea	   “renders	   prestigious	   support	   to	   the	  merit	  good	  approach.”16	  
A	  fully	  fledged	  ethical	  discussion	  can	  bring	  more	  radical	  criticism	  of	  welfarism.	  At	  a	  conference	  held	  in	  Australia	  in	  1986	  on	  the	  topics	  of	  rationality,	   individualism,	  and	  public	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  The	  quotation	  is	  from	  a	  letter	  from	  Musgrave	  to	  W.	  Ver	  Eecke,	  October	  12,	  2003.	  Richard	  A.	  Musgrave	  Papers,	  Box	  6,	  “Correspondence,”	  Princeton	  University	  Library.	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policy,17	   the	   philosopher	   Charles	   Taylor	   presented	   a	   paper	   in	   which	   he	   attacked	   the	  atomistic	  and	  individualistic	  conception	  of	  the	  good	  in	  welfarism.	  He	  argued	  that	  there	  are	  irreducibly	   social	   goods	   that	   lose	   their	   substance	   when	   conceptualized	   in	   individualistic	  terms.	  For	  Taylor	   (1990),	   individual	   agency	  only	  exists	   against	   a	  background	  of	   available	  meanings	   and	  other	  practices	  which	  are	   located	   in	   a	   shared	   culture.	   Language	   is	   such	  an	  irreducibly	  social	  good.	  Another	  instance	  is	  friendship,	  the	  goodness	  of	  which	  must	  be	  “the	  object	  of	  shared	  understanding,”	  or	  else	  it	  would	  not	  be	  friendship.	  More	  generally,	  Taylor	  argues	   that	   welfarism	   is	   a	   screen	   that	   hides	   the	   complexity	   of	   political	   and	   moral	  aspirations.	  For	  example,	  the	  aspiration	  to	  participatory	  self-­‐‑rule	  is	  a	  very	  strong	  element	  of	  the	  civic	  humanist	   tradition	  and	   is	   still	  part	  of	   the	  modern	  political	   identity	  of	   citizens	   in	  many	   countries	   (Sandel	   1996).	   Yet,	   it	   is	   badly	   understood	   by	   the	   individualistic	   liberal	  tradition	  of	  which	  welfarism	  and	  utilitarianism	  are	  part.	  Taylor	  also	  claims	  that	  our	  moral	  sense	  admits	  qualitative	  contrasts	  between	  orders	  of	  goods	  which	  cannot	  be	  captured	  by	  a	  utility	   function	  (Taylor	  1982).	  Human	  beings	  strive	   for	  excellence18	   in	  certain	  activities	  of	  their	   life,	   and	   these	   aspirations	   are	   not	   well	   captured	   by	   a	   flat	   preference–satisfaction	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  The	  concept	  of	  merit	  good	  was	  explicitly	  discussed	  by	  many	  participants	  and	  Musgrave’s	  (1987)	  and	  Head’s	  (1988)	  retrospective	  surveys	  of	  the	  concept	  were	  rewritten	  after	  the	  conference,	  according	  to	  the	  organizers,	  Brennan	  and	  Walsh	  (1990).	  
18	  Cooter	  and	  Gordley	  (1995)	  also	  develop	  their	  merit	  good	  model	  on	  Aristotelian	  arguments	  about	  excellence.	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conceptualization.19	  One	  example	  given	  by	  Taylor	  illustrates	  the	  conception	  of	  merit	  goods	  as	  irreducibly	  social	  goods	  that	  is	  defended	  by	  Grinberg	  and	  Rubinstein	  (2005).	  He	  explains	  how	  the	  majority	  French-­‐‑speaking	  community	  in	  Québec	  take	  political	  actions	  to	  preserve	  their	   language	   and	   their	   culture	   within	   the	   larger	   English-­‐‑speaking	   population	   of	   North	  America.	   Language	   is	   seen	   as	   a	   common	   good	   which	   led	   the	   democratic	   assembly	   to	  enshrine	   collective	   rights	   in	   a	   charter	   that	   take	   precedence	   over	   the	   choices	   some	  individuals	   might	   want	   to	   make	   (Taylor	   1990,	   58).	  Without	   necessarily	   endorsing	   these	  political	  aspirations,	  Taylor	  proposes	  	  that,	  if	  they	  are	  genuinely	  important	  for	  the	  members	  of	  one	  community,	  then	  the	  theory	  has	  to	  be	  able	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  them	  without	  completely	  deforming	  its	  reality.	  In	  this	  sense,	  merit	  good	  policies	  are	  a	  symptomatic	  manifestation	  of	  the	  narrowness	  of	  welfarism,	  when	  the	  latter	  attempts	  to	  rationalize	  the	  whole	  of	  social	  life.	  	  
Later	   in	  his	   life,	   reflecting	  on	  his	  German	  roots,	  Musgrave	   leaned	   in	   that	  direction:	  “Admittedly	  difficult	   to	  define	  and	  dangerous	   to	  entertain,	  communal	  concerns	  have	  been	  part	  of	  the	  scene	  from	  Plato	  on,	  and	  my	  concept	  of	  merit	  goods	  (applicable	  to	  private	  and	  social	  goods	  alike)	  was	  to	  provide	  a	  limited	  opening	  for	  their	  role”	  (Musgrave	  1997,	  30).	  A	  related,	  but	   even	  more	   foreign,	  notion	   to	  most	   economists	   is	   that	  of	   the	   common	  good	   as	  understood	  either	  in	  the	  Thomist	  or	  in	  the	  Hegelian	  tradition.	  When	  brought	  into	  resonance	  with	   social	   sciences,	  Mastromatteo	  and	  Solari	   (2014,	  93)	  define	   the	   common	  good	  as	   “an	  inter-­‐‑subjective	  evaluation	  concerning	  the	  realization	  of	  the	  processes	  needed	  to	  fulfill	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  That	  being	  said,	  following	  Frankfurt	  (1971),	  the	  idea	  of	  higher-­‐‑order	  goods	  has	  already	  been	  used	  by	  economists	  who	  modeled	  it	  using	  ranking	  of	  preferences,	  as	  was	  mentioned	  in	  the	  previous	  section.	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needs	  of	  the	  community.	  It	  concerns	  ‘an	  order	  of	  society’	  that	  is	  not	  reducible	  to	  individual	  needs	   and	   desires	   and	   is	   political	   in	   nature.”	   This	   allows	   them	   to	   define	  merit	   goods	   as	  “instruments	  used	  by	  the	  government	  to	  help	  achieve	  synergies	  with	  the	  action	  of	  members	  of	   the	  community	   towards	   the	  pursuit	  of	   that	  end	   [the	  common	  good]”	   (ibid.,	  96).	   In	   this	  sense,	   the	  common	  good	   is	  an	   intrinsically	  vague	  notion	  which	  cannot	  be	  produced	   like	  a	  commodity,	   but	   is	   rather	   a	   guiding	   force	   for	   the	   action	  of	   all	   the	   social	   actors,	   not	  unlike	  Colm’s	  idea	  of	  the	  public	  interest.	  In	  their	  understanding	  of	  merit	  goods,	  Mastromatteo	  and	  Solari	  (2014)	  have	  been	  influenced	  by	  the	  writing	  of	  the	  philosopher	  Wilfried	  Ver	  Eecke.	  
Ver	   Eecke	   has	   devoted	   considerable	   attention	   to	   the	   concept	   of	   merit	   goods.	   In	  addition	  to	  the	   large	  collection	  of	   fragments	  of	  Musgrave’s	  writing	  and	  secondary	  sources	  on	   merit	   goods	   that	   he	   collected	   in	   his	   Anthology	   (2007),	   he	   also	   proposed	   his	   own	  extended	   interpretation	   of	   the	   concept	   in	   a	   series	   of	   contributions.	   For	   Ver	   Eecke,	   the	  concept	  of	  merit	  goods	  was	  a	  Trojan	  horse	  in	  economics	  which	  led	  to	  an	  “unfinished	  ethical	  revolution.”	   A	   full	   acceptance	   of	   the	   concept	   would	   involve	   a	   “paradigm	   shift”	   from	   an	  “individualistic	  view	  of	  economics	  to	  a	  socio-­‐‑economic	  viewpoint”	  (Ver	  Eecke	  1998,	  134).	  In	  this	  regard,	   the	  provision	  of	  merit	  goods	   involves	  government	  activities	   that	  will	   “neither	  respect	  the	  Pareto	  principle	  nor	  the	  consumer	  sovereignty	  principle”	  (ibid.,	  139).	  Ver	  Eecke	  identifies	  merit	   goods	  using	   a	   transcendental	   argument.	   This	   type	  of	   argument,	   famously	  devised	  by	  Kant,	  calls	  for	  identifying	  the	  logical	  possibility	  conditions	  for	  something	  to	  be:	  “We	   shall	   call	   merit	   goods	   those	   goods	   which	   are	   the	   conditions	   for	   the	   possibility	   of	  something	   that	   is	   desired	   by	   the	   consumers,	   even	   and	   especially	   if	   these	  merit	   goods	   or	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services	  themselves	  are	  not	  preferred	  by	  consumers”	  (ibid.).20	  The	  philosopher	  then	  takes	  the	  following	  as	  a	  premise:	  “The	  first	  thing	  that	  Western	  citizens	  as	  economic	  actors	  wish	  is	  a	   free	   market”	   (ibid.,	   140).	   Then,	   drawing	   from	   Adam	   Smith’s	   and	   Henry	   C.	   Simons’s	  writing,	  Ver	  Eecke	  deduces	  a	  list	  of	  necessary	  governmental	  interventions	  to	  secure	  a	  free	  market.	   The	   list	   includes	   the	   traditional	   night-­‐‑watchman	   state	   functions	   and	   further	  neoliberal	   duties	   such	   as	   enforcement	   of	   competition	   against	   monopolies,	   but	   also	  education	  as	  a	  means	  to	  improve	  “the	  rationality	  of	  the	  consumers”	  (ibid.,	  143).	  In	  a	  recent	  elaboration	   of	   his	   argument,	   Ver	   Eecke	   (2013,	   Chapter	  4)	   produces	   a	   list	   of	   eleven	  categories	   of	   merit	   goods:	   limited	   property	   rights,	   institutions	   to	   promote	   efficiency,	  business	  cycle	  stabilization,	  education,	  a	  limited	  safety	  net,	  public	  health	  measures,	  a	  well-­‐‑functioning	  social	   contract,	   transparency	  and	  prevention	  of	   corruption,	   strategic	  planning	  and	  industrial	  policy,	  environmental	  protection,	  and	  protection	  of	  cultural	  heritage.	  	  
There	  are	  at	  least	  three	  problems	  with	  Ver	  Eecke’s	  argument.	  First,	  his	  premise	  is	  far	  from	  consensual.	  Even	  if	  we	  accept	  a	  flexible	  definition	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  free	  market,21	  it	  is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  This	  definition	  would	  align	  merit	  goods	  with	  the	  concept	  of	  intermediate	  goods	  (see	  Colm	  1965,	  215).	  Musgrave	  (1969b)	  already	  used	  the	  concept	  of	  intermediate	  social	  goods	  to	  describe	  these	  cases,	  something	  that	  Ver	  Eecke	  does	  not	  mention.	  	  
21	  One	  way	  to	  interpret	  Ver	  Eecke’s	  claim	  that	  economic	  actors	  desire	  a	  free	  market	  is	  through	  his	  reading	  of	  Hegel’s	  Philosophy	  of	  Rights.	  For	  Hegel,	  the	  market,	  or	  civil	  society,	  is	  an	  ethical	  institution	  that	  emerged	  with	  the	  growth	  of	  commercial	  society	  in	  the	  modern	  age.	  The	  identity	  of	  the	  economic	  agent	  is	  concomitant	  with	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  free	  economic	  sphere.	  So	  the	  market	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  promoting	  individual	  freedom	  in	  the	  modern	  world.	  It	  realizes	  the	  individual’s	  subjectivity	  (Ver	  Eecke	  2008,	  Chapter	  3).	  Yet,	  it	  is	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not	  obvious	  that	  citizens	  in	  western	  countries	  are	  all	  striving	  for	  that	  institution,	   let	  alone	  the	   fact	   that	   as	   an	   institution	   it	   is	   only	   an	   intermediate	   good	   in	   itself.	   In	   this	   regard,	   the	  Rawlsian	  approach	  presented	  above,	  which	  also	  conceives	  of	  merit	  goods	  as	   instrumental	  stepping	  stones,	   is	  more	  generally	  applicable	  because	   it	  does	  not	  presuppose	  any	  specific	  conception	  of	  the	  good.	  Second,	  even	  if	  one	  accepts	  his	  premise,	  Ver	  Eecke’s	  types	  of	  merit	  goods	  are	  not	  pure	  deductions	  in	  the	  Kantian	  sense	  that	  space	  and	  time	  are	  necessary	  for	  making	  sense	  of	  empirical	   reality.	  Nor	  can	   they	  be	  deduced	   from	  the	  practical	  categorical	  imperative.	   They	   are	  more	   of	   the	   hypothetical	   imperative	   type,	   because	   they	   depend	   on	  empirical	   knowledge.	   That	   such-­‐‑and-­‐‑such	   an	   institution	   is	   favorable	   to	  market	   efficiency	  has	  been	  a	  matter	  of	  debate	  among	  economists	  for	  centuries.	  
Third,	  Ver	  Eecke’s	  approach	  leads	  him	  to	  argue	  that	  national	  defense	  is	  a	  merit	  good,	  along	  with	  other	  previously	  labeled	  public	  goods.	  Yet,	  he	  forcefully	  defends	  the	  conceptual	  separation	  between	  public	  goods	  and	  merit	  goods,	  arguing	  that	  they	  are	  both	  ideal	  concepts	  (Ver	   Eecke	   1999,	   2003).	   In	   view	   of	   the	   conceptual	   overlap	   on	   particular	   tokens	   such	   as	  national	  defense,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  that	  such	  an	  extension	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  merit	  goods	  helps	  to	  clarify	  the	  public	  policy	  debate,	   let	  alone	  convince	  economists	  to	  use	  the	  concept.	  Overall,	  there	   is	   a	   tension	  between	  Ver	  Eecke’s	  wish	   to	   broaden	   the	   concept	   and	  his	   intention	   to	  limit	  its	  range	  (Ver	  Eecke	  1998,	  139).	  He	  sees	  a	  limitation	  inasmuch	  as	  government	  needs	  reasons	  or	  arguments	  to	  take	  over	  some	  responsibilities	  for	  guaranteeing	  the	  efficiency	  of	  the	   market.	   Still,	   this	   requirement	   of	   providing	   public	   reasons	   for	   state	   action	   is	   also	   a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  not	  self-­‐‑sufficient	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  the	  state,	  as	  a	  higher	  ethical	  realm,	  must	  solve	  some	  of	  the	  contradictions	  generated	  by	  the	  market	  (Hegel	  1821).	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common	   theme	  of	  many	   theories	   of	   deliberative	  democracy.	  Thus,	   it	   is	   not	   clear	   that	   the	  concept	   of	   merit	   goods	   really	   brings	   something	   new	   for	   that	   purpose.	   Nonetheless,	   Ver	  Eecke’s	  writing	   provides	   a	   heuristic	   approach	   to	   discussing	   governmental	   duties	  without	  the	  straightjacket	  of	  market	  failure.	  His	  aim	  is	  not	  to	  prescribe	  specific	  policies,	  but	  mainly	  to	  open	  the	  debate	  (Ver	  Eecke	  2013,	  57,	  79).	  
The	  ethical	  (and	  political)	  interpretative	  strand	  of	  the	  concept	  that	  I	  reconstructed	  in	  this	   section	   started	   later	   than	   in	   the	   first	   mainstream	   strand	   discussed	   in	   the	   previous	  section.	  This	  lag,	  just	  as	  with	  Musgrave’s	  apparent	  lack	  of	  sufficient	  arguments	  to	  justify	  the	  concept	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	   1950s,	   reflects	   the	   absence	   of	   a	   suitable	   ethical	   theory	   for	  economists	   to	   rely	   on.	   Sen’s	   and	   Rawls’s	   theories	   of	   justice	   are	   appealing	   to	   economists	  because	   they	   allow	   for	   a	   rational	   discussion	  of	   normative	   issues,	   something	   that	  was	  not	  available	   at	   the	   time	  Musgrave	   coined	   the	   concept.	   The	   ordinalist	   revolution	   successfully	  converted	  economists	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  normative	  issues	  were	  non-­‐‑scientific	  and	  welfare	  was	  only	   a	   subjective	   dimension	   that	   could	   be	   measured	   through	   the	   revelation	   of	   choices	  (Cooter	  and	  Rappoport	  1984).	  The	  conversion	  succeeded,	  because	  the	  two	  moral	  theories	  in	  vogue	  in	  English-­‐‑speaking	  countries	  in	  the	  first	  half	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century	  were	  G.	  E.	  Moore’s	   intuitionism	  and	  the	  emotivist	   theory	  of	  A.	   J.	  Ayer,	  which	  had	  strong	  roots	   in	   the	  sensualist	  tradition	  (Davis	  1990).22	  Ironically,	  Moore’s	  intuitionism	  served	  as	  a	  straw	  man	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  Backhouse	  and	  Nishizawa	  (2010b)	  reveal	  the	  plurality	  of	  views	  on	  welfare	  in	  Britain	  in	  the	  1920s.	  Yet,	  by	  the	  1930s,	  the	  positivist	  aspirations	  of	  economists	  had	  considerably	  reduced	  the	  range	  of	  acceptable	  positions,	  in	  particular	  among	  the	  younger	  generation	  of	  LSE	  economists.	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of	  cognitive	  ethics	  which	  justified	  the	  rejection	  of	  cognitivist	  approaches	  altogether.23	  Thus,	  when	   Robbins	   condemns	   normative	   judgments	   as	   non-­‐‑scientific,	   it	   is	   because	   he	   takes	  morality	  as	  mere	  feelings,	  which	  cannot	  be	  the	  object	  of	  a	  rational	  discussion:	  
In	   the	   rough-­‐and-­‐tumble	   of	   political	   struggle,	   differences	   of	   opinion	   may	   arise	   either	   as	   a	   result	   of	  
differences	  about	  ends	  or	  as	  a	  result	  of	  differences	  about	  the	  means	  of	  attaining	  ends.	  Now,	  as	  regards	  the	  
first	  type	  of	  difference,	  neither	  Economics	  nor	  any	  other	  science	  can	  provide	  any	  solvent.	   If	  we	  disagree	  
about	  ends,	   it	   is	   a	   case	  of	   thy	  blood	  or	  mine	  —	  or	   live	  and	   let	   live,	   according	   to	   the	   importance	  of	   the	  
difference,	   or	   the	   relative	   strength	   of	   our	   opponents.	   But	   if	   we	   disagree	   about	   means,	   then	   scientific	  
analysis	   can	  often	  help	  us	   to	   resolve	  our	  differences.	   If	  we	  disagree	  about	   the	  morality	  of	   the	   taking	  of	  
interest	   (and	   we	   understand	   what	   we	   are	   talking	   about),	   then	   there	   is	   no	   room	   for	   argument	  	  
(Robbins	  1932,	  134).	  Twenty	   years	   later,	   Friedman	   drove	   the	   point	   further	   when	   he	   argued	   that	  economics	   should	   focus	   on	   positive	   issues	   because	   normative	   ones	   can	   only	   lead	   to	  emotional	  disputes:	  
I	  venture	  the	  judgment,	  however,	  that	  currently	  in	  the	  Western	  world,	  and	  especially	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  
differences	   about	   economic	   policy	   among	   disinterested	   citizens	   derive	   predominantly	   from	   different	  
predictions	   about	   the	   economic	   consequences	   of	   taking	   action-­‐differences	   that	   in	   principle	   can	   be	  
eliminated	   by	   the	   progress	   of	   positive	   economics	   –	   rather	   than	   from	   fundamental	   differences	   in	   basic	  
values,	  differences	  about	  which	  men	  can	  ultimately	  only	  fight	  (Friedman	  1953,	  5).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  Yet,	  as	  Habermas	  (1990,	  50	  ff)	  observes,	  moral	  theory	  does	  not	  need	  to	  be	  intuitionist	  or	  emotivist.	  A	  similar	  point	  is	  made	  by	  Nussbaum	  (2000,	  127):	  She	  explains	  Harsanyi’s	  hesitation	  to	  engage	  with	  a	  normative	  theory	  of	  justice	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  he	  was	  convinced	  that	  the	  two	  moral	  theories	  available	  were	  G.	  E.	  Moore’s	  theory	  of	  mental	  states	  and	  hedonism.	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This	  might	  explain	  why,	  in	  1959,	  Musgrave	  could	  only	  assert	  that	  rejecting	  all	  merit	  wants	  “is	   not	   a	   sensible	   view”	   without	   providing	   convincing	   normative	   arguments	   to	   back	   his	  claim.	  In	  other	  words,	  there	  was	  no	  ethical	  theory	  available	  to	  justify	  his	  merit	  wants.	  
3.  FROM	  A	  SOCIAL	  VALUE	  SCALE	  TO	  NON-­‐INDIVIDUALISTIC	  SOCIAL	  
WELFARE	  FUNCTIONS	  
In	   this	   section,	   I	   discuss	   some	   attempts	   at	   representing	  merit	   goods	   in	   a	   formal	  manner	  with	  a	  non-­‐‑individualistic	  social	  welfare	  function.	  Even	  if	  it	  does	  not	  aim	  at	  a	  reconciliation,	  this	  mathematical	  representation	  is	  general	  enough	  to	  capture	  both	  strands	  of	  justification	  previously	  discussed.	  These	  formalization	  attempts	  date	  back	  to	  the	  early	  1970s.	  Moreover,	  I	   claim	   that	   this	   representation	   is	   actually	   very	   much	   in	   line	   with	   how	   Musgrave	  conceptualized	   the	   state	   in	   his	   unpublished	  PhD	  dissertation,	   at	   a	   time	  when	  he	  was	  not	  constrained	  by	  the	  methodological	  rules	  of	  New	  welfare	  economics.	  	  
In	   his	   dissertation	   defended	   at	   Harvard	   in	   1937,	   Musgrave	   brings	   together	   the	  expenditure	  and	  the	  taxation	  sides	  of	  public	  finance	  in	  a	  rational	  theory	  of	  the	  government	  budget.	   He	   wants	   to	   assess	   the	   net	   effect	   of	   the	   revenue–expenditure	   process	   on	   the	  national	  welfare.	  On	  the	  question	  of	  the	  subject	  of	  his	  rational	  model,	  Musgrave	  rejects	  both	  the	   Italian	   subjectivist	   assumption	   and	   the	   organic	   view	   defended	   by	   some	   German	  scholars.24	  He	  argues	  that	  social	  wants	  are	  neither	   felt	  directly	  by	  the	   individuals,	  nor	  are	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  Mazzola	  (1890)	  and	  De	  Viti	  de	  Marco	  (1934)	  are	  representatives	  of	  the	  Italian	  tradition.	  Ritschl	  (1931)	  is	  a	  twentieth-­‐‑century	  representative	  of	  the	  older	  German	  holistic	  view.	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they	   felt	   by	   the	   community	   as	   a	   whole.	   Musgrave	   rather	   adopts	   the	   German	   public	  
household	   approach.	   Accordingly,	   a	   more	   realistic	   subject	   for	   his	   model	   is	   the	   budget	  planner.	  When	  trying	  to	  assess	  the	  benefits	  of	  public	  services,	  Musgrave	  runs	  into	  trouble.	  He	  struggles	  to	  attribute	  benefits	  to	  individuals	  when	  some	  needs	  can	  only	  be	  satisfied	  by	  indivisible	  goods	  that	  benefit	  everyone	  equally.	  Musgrave	  names	  them	  social	  wants	  proper.	  Besides,	  he	  assumes	  the	  existence	  of	  individual	  needs	  that	  are	  normally	  satisfied	  by	  goods	  allocated	   by	   the	   market.	   Yet,	   the	   Public	   Economy	   (or	   the	   state),	   thanks	   to	   its	   coercive	  power,	   can	   also	  decide	   to	   satisfy	   individual	  wants	   (Musgrave	  1937,	   335).	  Next	   arises	   the	  question	  of	  how	  to	  compare	  the	  benefits	  of	  services	  that	  satisfy	  individual	  wants	  and	  those	  that	  satisfy	  social	  wants	  proper.	  Musgrave	  claims	  that	  the	  state	  planner	  can	  homogenize	  the	  heterogeneous	   collection	   of	   needs	   by	   reducing	   them	   to	   a	   common	   denominator,	   social	  
importance:	  
The	   comparison	   is	   rendered	  possible	   by	   reducing	  both	   types	  of	  wants	   to	   a	   common	  denominator,	   thus	  
rendering	  the	  aggregate	  body	  of	  wants	  homogeneous.	  The	  government,	   if	  deciding	  to	  satisfy	  “individual	  
wants”	  looks	  at	  the	  latter	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  social	  necessity,	  i.e.,	  they	  are	  satisfied	  qua	  social’	  –	  not	  
qua	   individual’	   wants.	   While,	   therefore,	   from	   the	   point	   of	   view	   of	   the	   individual	   household,	   the	   total	  
system	  of	  wants	  appears	  non-­‐homogeneous	  (consisting	  of	  individual	  and	  social	  wants),	  from	  the	  point	  of	  
view	  of	  Public	  Economy	  the	  total	  system	  of	  wants	  is	  homogeneous	  (consisting	  of	  social	  wants	  proper	  and	  
socially	  interpreted	  individual	  wants)	  (Musgrave	  1937,	  336).	  Thus,	   the	   public	   economist	   can	   assume	   that	   a	   given	   schedule	   of	   social	   wants	   is	  available	   to	  him,	   just	   as	  he	  would	  assume	  a	  given	   set	  of	  preferences	   in	   consumer	   theory.	  This	  idea	  of	  a	  schedule	  of	  social	  want	  is	  a	  direct,	  unformalized,	  antecedent	  to	  Bergson’s	  idea	  of	  Economic	  Welfare	  Function	   (1938)	  which	  will	  be	  reframed	  into	  Social	  Welfare	  Function	  (SWF)	   by	   Samuelson	   (1947),	   both	   Harvard	   colleagues	   of	   Musgrave’s.	   After	   the	   war,	  Musgrave	  will	  abandon	  his	  phrase	  of	  a	  schedule	  of	  social	  wants	  in	  favor	  of	  SWF.	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Furthermore,	  we	  can	  see	  in	  the	  idea	  of	  socially	  interpreted	  individual	  wants	  a	  direct	  ancestor	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  merit	  wants.	  Yet,	   in	  his	  dissertation,	  this	  type	  of	  want	  does	  not	  pose	  a	  greater	  methodological	  problem	  than	  other	  social	  wants	  proper,	  because	  Musgrave	  takes	  the	  public	  household	  perspective	  and	  he	  does	  not	  attempt	  to	  relate	  the	  evaluation	  of	  social	  wants	  to	  individual	  demands.	  He	  does	  not	  question	  the	  suitability	  of	  an	  overarching	  point	   of	   view.	   For	   instance,	   he	   notes	   that	   there	   are	   cases	   of	   transfers	   in	   kind	   in	   which	  individuals	  undervalue	  some	  goods	  compared	  to	  their	  social	  value:	  
[There	  exists]	  a	  large	  number	  of	  public	  expenditure	  items,	  aiming	  at	  the	  satisfaction	  of	  individual	  
wants,	   but	   proceeding	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   social,	   rather	   than	   individual,	   evaluation	   of	   such	  wants.	  
Instead	   of	   housing,	   a	   free	   supply	   of	   educational,	  medical	   or	   sanitary	   services	   could	   have	   been	  
chosen	  as	  examples.	  Not	  only	  may	  in	  certain	  instances	  the	  individual	  evaluation	  of	  such	  services	  
be	  below	  the	  social	  one,	  but	   it	  may	  actually	  be	  zero	  or	  negative.	  [...]	  The	  sociological	  process	   in	  
back	   of	   the	   formulation	   of	   social	   value	   scales	   is	   far	   more	   intricate	   than	   that	   of	   the	   simple	  
arithmetical	  addition	  of	  items	  of	  individual	  evaluation	  (Musgrave	  1937,	  348–9).	  Hence,	   by	   taking	   the	   Old	   welfare	   position	   of	   a	   social	   value	   not	   reducible	   to	   individual	  evaluations,	  Musgrave	  could	  assume	  that	  the	  state	  was	  satisfying	  both	  social	  wants	  proper	  and	   socially	   interpreted	   individual	   wants	   (later	   merit	   wants).25	   The	   social	   planner	   was	  assumed	  to	  be	  taking	  decisions	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  scale	  of	  social	  importance	  that	  comprises	  both	  types	  of	  need.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  The	  ‘Old’	  welfare	  character	  of	  Musgrave’s	  dissertation	  follows	  from	  his	  public	  household	  point	  of	  view	  and	  his	  acceptance	  of	  interpersonal	  comparisons	  as	  a	  “workable	  assumption.”	  Following	  Pigou	  (1932),	  he	  argues:	  “The	  capacity	  to	  enjoy	  benefits	  is	  after	  all	  but	  part	  of	  the	  general	  nature	  of	  ‘man.’	  It	  being	  the	  generally	  accepted	  procedure	  to	  define	  certain	  general	  characteristics	  of	  men,	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  why	  no	  typical	  degree	  of	  intensity	  for	  the	  enjoyment	  of	  benefits	  could	  be	  assumed”	  (Musgrave	  1937,	  274).	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Bergson	  and	  Samuelson’s	  SWF	  rendered	  explicit	  the	  social	  value	  judgments	  made	  in	  welfare	  economics.	  To	  respect	  the	  common	  assumptions	  at	  the	  time,	  Samuelson	  argued	  that	  economists	   would	   agree	   on	   SWF	   that	   were	   monotonously	   increasing	   functions	   of	   the	  individual	  utilities.	  Musgrave	  assumed	  throughout	  his	  life	  that	  decisions	  on	  public	  goods	  in	  a	  democratic	  society	  had	  to	  reflect,	  in	  some	  way	  or	  another,	  the	  choices	  of	  the	  citizens.	  Yet,	  for	   most	   welfare	   economists,	   Arrow’s	   (1951)	   impossibility	   theorem	   was	   inconvenient,	  because	   it	   meant	   that	   the	   SWF	   could	   not	   represent	   a	   collective	   choice	   aggregated	   from	  individual	   preferences.	   To	   avoid	   the	   problem,	   many	   welfare	   economists	   retracted	   their	  ambition	   and	   reinterpreted	   the	   SWF	   as	   representing	   the	   view	   of	   a	   single	   individual	  (Desmarais-­‐‑Tremblay	  2014,	  279).	  Still,	  for	  many,	  the	  SWF	  was	  a	  tool	  to	  represent	  society’s	  value	   judgments,	   including	   cases	   in	   which	   they	   might	   differ	   from	   those	   of	   some	   of	   its	  members.	  At	  the	  very	  least,	  it	  was	  acknowledged	  that	  the	  standard	  utility	  representation	  of	  individuals	  could	  not	  account	  for	  many	  goods	  provided	  by	  the	  state.	  	  
Elisha	  A.	  Pazner	  (1972)	  addressed	  this	  problem	  in	  a	  paper	  based	  on	  the	  first	  chapter	  of	  his	  dissertation	  written	  at	  Harvard	  under	  the	  supervision	  of	  Musgrave.	  He	  defined	  merit	  wants	  as	  cases	  in	  which	  society,	  represented	  by	  a	  SWF,	  would	  “impose	  [its]	  choice.”	  In	  line	  with	  what	  I	  called	  the	  mainstream	  approach,	  he	  argued	  that	  the	  only	  acceptable	  rationale	  for	  non-­‐‑individualistic	  imposed	  choice	  was	  based	  on	  the	  premise	  of	  imperfect	  information	  (Pazner	   1972,	   461).	   Yet,	   like	   many	   others	   modeling	   work	   in	   that	   vein,	   he	   avoided	   the	  question	  of	  how	  these	  societal	   judgments	  were	  related	  to	  individuals.	  As	  Roskamp	  (1975)	  put	  it:	  “If	  we	  introduce	  in	  the	  following	  analysis	  social	  preferences	  it	  should	  be	  understood	  that	   these	   are	   based	   on	   individual	   preferences,	   though	   we	   do	   not	   know,	   in	   what	   way	  precisely,	  individual	  preferences	  generate	  social	  preferences,	  given	  the	  present	  state	  of	  our	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science.”	  Pazner	  uses	  the	  following	  notation:	  For	  individual	  ℎ	  (ℎ = 1, . . . , 𝐻),	  the	  amount	  of	  private	   good	   𝑗	   (𝑗 = 1, . . . , 𝑛)	   she	   consumes	   is	   𝑥,- .	   She	   derives	   utility	   𝑈-	   from	   her	  consumption	   vector	  𝑥- = (𝑥/-, . . . , 𝑥0-).	   Pazner	   then	  defines	   the	   general	   formulation	  of	   the	  SWF	  to	  account	  for	  merit	  goods	  as:	  
𝑊 = 𝑊(𝑈/, . . . , 𝑈2; 𝑥//, . . . , 𝑥,-, . . . , 𝑥02)	  
with	  𝑊	   increasing	   in	  each	  of	   its	  𝑈-arguments	  and	   454678 ≠ 0	   for	  at	   least	  one	  good	  –	  a	  merit	  good.	  W	   captures	   the	   idea	   that	   society	   values	   some	  goods	  over	   and	   above	   the	   value	   that	  individuals	   express	   in	   their	   utility	   function,	   which	   is	   why	   these	   goods	   enter	   as	   direct	  arguments	   in	  the	  SWF.	  In	  this	  general	   formulation,	  society	  can	  give	  weight	  to	  any	  specific	  good	   consumed	   by	   any	   individual.	   It	   provides	   a	   formal	   representation	   of	   the	   quantity	   of	  goods	   society	   might	   wish	   to	   distribute	   (allocate)	   to	   specific	   individuals	   (or	   groups	   of	  individuals)	  above	  what	  they	  would	  buy	  in	  the	  market.	  It	  thus	  combines	  the	  ideas	  of	  merit	  goods	  as	  redistribution	  in	  kind	  and	  of	  “social	  value	  judgments”	  (Rüffer	  2007).	  In	  the	  rest	  of	  his	  paper,	  Pazner	  (1972)	  assumes	  that	  only	  the	  aggregate	  level	  of	  the	  merit	  goods	  enter	  the	  SWF,	   disregarding	   the	   information	   on	   their	   distribution.26	  He	   then	   derives	   the	   necessary	  conditions	   for	   optimal	   allocation.	   The	   first-­‐‑best	   solution	   is	   a	   set	   of	   commodity	   taxes	   for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  The	  SWF	  thus	  becomes	  𝑊 = 𝑊(𝑈/, . . . , 𝑈2; 𝑋/, . . . , 𝑋0)	  where	  𝑋, = 𝑋,-- 	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demerit	   goods	   and	   subsidies	   for	  merit	   goods.27	   The	   effect	   of	   this	   system	  of	   excise	   is	   that	  producers	  face	  different	  prices	  from	  consumers	  (Pazner	  1972,	  469).28	  
Pazner’s	  merit	  goods	  are	  specific	  commodities.	  Yet,	  ever	  since	  Musgrave	  coined	  the	  concept,	  many	  have	  argued	  that	  they	  are	  social	  or	  public	  goods,	  or	  at	  least	  partially	  public	  goods.	  In	  his	  famous	  paper,	  Samuelson	  (1954)	  had	  derived	  the	  optimality	  conditions	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  collective	  goods	  for	  an	  individualistic	  social	  welfare	  function.	  The	  suggestion	  of	  incorporating	  collective	  or	  public	  goods	  directly	   in	   the	  SWF	  similarly	   to	  equation	  (1)	  was	  made	  by	  Johansen	  (1965).	  Although	  Pazner	  (1972)	  does	  not	  refer	  to	  Johansen,	  his	  book	  was	  widely	  known	  in	  public	  economics/public	  finance	  by	  the	  time	  he	  defended	  his	  dissertation.	  Johansen	   did	   not	   use	   the	   concept	   of	   merit	   goods,	   yet	   he	   justifies	   his	   suggestion	   using	   a	  familiar	  argument:	  “it	  may	  easily	  happen	  that	  the	  authorities	  of	  a	  country	  ascribe	  to	  public	  use	  of	  goods	  and	  services	  a	  value	  beyond	  that	  is	  expressed	  through	  individual	  preferences	  scales”	  (Johansen	  1965,	  128).	  Thus,	  in	  a	  world	  of	  two	  individuals,	  A	  and	  B,	  the	  social	  welfare	  function	  can	  take	  the	  form:	  
𝑊 = 𝑊(𝑈<, 𝑈=, 𝐺)	  
where	   𝐺	   is	   the	   “collective	   want.”	   This	   suggestion	   was	   followed	   by	   Folkers	   (1974),	   who	  derived	   the	   necessary	   conditions	   for	   optimal	   provision	   of	   private-­‐‑merit	   and	   public-­‐‑merit	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  Respectively	  defined	  as	  454?7 < 0	  and	  454?7 > 0.	  
28	  In	  terms	  of	  the	  general	  formulation	  where	  merit	  goods	  are	  indexed	  to	  individuals,	  it	  would	  call	  for	  individualistic	  prices.	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goods.29	  A	  few	  years	  later,	  Baigent	  (1981)	  tried	  to	  overcome	  the	  “ad-­‐‑hoc”	  definition	  of	  the	  non-­‐‑individualistic	   welfare	   function	   comprising	   merit	   goods	   by	   proposing	   a	   model	   with	  individualistic	   foundations.	   He	   assumes	   that	   the	   set	   of	   commodities	   consumed	   by	   an	  individual	   𝑖	   can	   be	   separated	   into	   two	   subsets:	   those	   that	   have	   a	   merit	   value	   𝑥C =(𝑥/C , . . . , 𝑥DC )	   and	   those	   that	  do	  not	  𝑦C = (𝑦/C , . . . , 𝑦0C ).	   Furthermore,	   following	  Arrow	  (1951),	  he	  assumes	  that	  individuals	  have	  a	  ranking	  according	  to	  tastes	  and	  a	  ranking	  according	  to	  values,	   defined	   respectively	   as	   𝑇 = 𝑇(𝑥, 𝑦)	   and	   𝑉 = 𝑉(𝑥, 𝑦).	   Baigent	   asserts	   that	   social	  choice	  reflects	  individual	  values,	  as	  individual	  behavior	  is	  based	  on	  both	  tastes	  and	  values.30	  He	  then	  shows	  that,	  for	  special	  cases	  of	  the	  behavior	  function,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  represent	  the	  individual	  values	  as	  a	  function	  of	  the	  behavior	  and	  of	  the	  merit	  goods:	  
𝑉(𝑥, 𝑦) = 𝐺(𝐵(𝑥, 𝑦), 𝑥)	  
This	  individualistic	  value	  function	  exhibits	  the	  same	  form	  as	  the	  desired	  non-­‐‑individualistic	  SWF.31	   It	  can	  thus	  be	  aggregated	  into	  the	  desired	  SWF	  form,	  a	  step	  that	   is	  not	  realized	  by	  Baigent	  (1981)	  in	  his	  short	  paper.	  It	  means	  that	  non-­‐‑individualistic	  functions	  might	  have	  an	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  A	  similar	  model	  has	  been	  developed	  by	  Roskamp	  (1975)	  apparently	  without	  knowledge	  of	  the	  Pazner	  (1972)	  and	  Folkers	  (1974)	  papers.	  He	  uses	  a	  more	  cumbersome	  typology	  of	  private,	  merit,	  and	  public	  goods,	  and	  defines	  the	  SWF	  as	  a	  function	  of	  the	  individual	  utilities	  and	  of	  a	  set	  of	  society’s	  preference	  functions	  for	  the	  merit	  goods	  (rather	  than	  just	  the	  goods	  directly	  entering	  as	  argument).	  Besley	  (1988),	  Walsh	  (1987),	  and	  Cooter	  and	  Gordley	  (1995)	  are	  among	  those	  who	  also	  used	  a	  similar	  non-­‐‑individualistic	  function	  for	  conceptualizing	  merit	  goods.	  
30	  The	  behavior	  function	  can	  be	  expressed	  as	  𝐵(𝑥, 𝑦) = 𝐵I(𝑇(𝑥, 𝑦), 𝑉(𝑥, 𝑦)).	  
31	  Provided	  that	  the	  individual	  utilities	  are	  represented	  by	  behavior	  functions.	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individualistic	   basis,	   but	   Baigent’s	   proof	   does	   not	   provide	   a	   way	   of	   tracking	   back	   to	   see	  whether	  any	  specific	  SWF	  had	  such	  a	  basis	  or	  not	  (Munro	  2009,	  171).	  A	  political	  procedure	  has	   to	   be	   theorized	   in	   order	   to	   explain	   how	   merit	   considerations	   might	   arise	   in	   the	  collective	   choice	   process.	   The	   conceptualization	   of	  merit	   goods	   as	   direct	   arguments	   in	   a	  non-­‐‑individualistic	  social	  welfare	   function	  allowed	  the	  concept	   to	  enter	  public	  economics.	  For	   example,	   it	  was	   recently	  used	  by	  Dasgupta	   (2005,	  240)	  as	   an	  argument	   to	   show	   that	  contemporary	  (mainstream)	  economics	  can	  deal	  with	  different	  ethical	  foundations.	  	  
The	   non-­‐‑individualistic	   SWF	   can	   also	   represent	  many	   views	   discussed	   in	   the	   first	  and	   second	   sections	   of	   this	   paper.	   Since	   it	   is	   blind	   with	   respect	   to	   the	   aggregation	  procedure,	  it	  is	  compatible	  with	  many	  moral	  and	  political	  theories.	  It	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  idea	   that	   the	   citizens’	   moral	   sense	  might	   lead	   them	   to	   support	   policies	   which	   put	   more	  weight	   on	   specific	   goods,	   or	   to	   provide	   basic	   amounts	   of	   certain	   goods	   to	   citizens	  disadvantaged	  by	   the	  primary	  market	  allocation.	  Yet,	   it	   can	  also	  be	  used	   to	   represent	   the	  correction	   of	   individual	   choices	   because	   of	   frame-­‐‑dependence,	   or	   lack	   of	   information.	  Finally,	  the	  merit	  dimension	  is	  applicable	  to	  technically	  collective	  and	  private	  goods	  as	  well.	  
In	   retrospect,	   the	   non-­‐‑individualistic	   SWF	   formalizes	   Musgrave’s	   early	   idea	   of	   a	  homogeneous	   social	   value	   scale,	   combining	   both	   social	   wants	   and	   socially	   interpreted	  individual	  wants.	  Both	  represent	  a	  social	  value	  judgment,	  or	  a	  social	  perspective	  that	  is	  not	  (necessarily)	   reducible	   to	   individual	   value	   judgments.	   However,	   Musgrave’s	   social	   value	  scale	  was	  conceived	   for	   the	  Public	  Economy	  only.	  Contrary	  to	  a	  SWF,	   it	  was	  not	  meant	   to	  represent	  in	  a	  single	  expression	  the	  welfare	  of	  the	  whole	  National	  Economy.	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Still,	  is	  the	  non-­‐‑individualistic	  SWF	  synthesizing	  all	  approaches	  to	  merit	  goods?	  I	  will	  mention	   four	   objections	   to	   this	   inference.	   First,	   if	   all	   policy-­‐‑relevant	   considerations	  were	  included	  in	  the	  SWF,	  for	  instance	  everything	  that	  is	  required	  for	  human	  flourishing,	  then	  the	  simple	   formula	   might	   lose	   its	   usefulness.	   Second,	   the	   merit	   goods	   in	   the	   SWF	   might	  represent	  Rawls’s	  primary	  goods,	  but,	  like	  most	  apocryphal	  use	  of	  Rawls	  by	  economists,	  it	  would	  not	  fully	  respect	  his	  Theory	  of	  Justice.	  Rawls’s	  justice	  as	  fairness	  is	  a	  liberal	  Kantian	  theory	   that	   rejects	   the	   utilitarian	   conceptualization	   implicit	   in	   utility	   function	  representation,	  because	  it	  does	  not	  give	  absolute	  priority	  to	  the	  right	  over	  the	  good.	  Third,	  it	  seems	  that	  the	  non-­‐‑individualistic	  SWF	  is	  unable	  to	  distinguish	  between	  goods	  that	  have	  an	  irreducible	  social	  nature	  and	  goods	  for	  which	  the	  social	  planner	  would	  like	  to	  proceed	  to	  direct	   allocation	   in	   kind.	   The	   formalism	   is	   flexible	   enough	   to	   be	   compatible	   with	   both	  interpretations,	  which	  also	  means	  that	  it	  fails	  to	  single	  out	  specific	  policy	  purposes.	  This	  is	  a	  common	  feature	  of	  many	  mathematical	  representations	  in	  economics.	  Translating	  concepts	  into	   formal	   definitions	   reduces	   ambiguity,	   but	   it	   can	   also	   hide	   the	   diversity	   of	   potential	  semantic	  interpretations.	  In	  a	  nutshell,	  fixing	  a	  formal	  representation	  for	  merit	  goods	  does	  not	  resolve	  the	  question	  of	  the	  legitimate	  interventions	  of	  the	  state,	  raised	  in	  the	  previous	  two	  sections.	  
CONCLUSION	  
For	  all	  its	  conceptual	  ambiguities	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  was	  rejected	  by	  many	  economists,	  it	  is	  striking	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  merit	  wants	  has	  survived	  for	  60	  years.	  At	  least	  it	  has	  outlived	  its	  creator	  who	  passed	  away	  in	  2007	  (see	  Figure	  2).	  The	  graph	  shows	  that	  occurrences	  of	  merit	  wants	   (and	   merit	   goods)	   are	   relatively	   more	   numerous	   than	   references	   to	   “Richard	   A.	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Musgrave”	   in	   the	   books	   digitalized	   by	   Google.	   The	   survival	   of	   the	   concept	   points	   to	   two	  conjectures	  on	  the	  history	  of	  welfare	  economics:	  First,	  we	  can	  tentatively	  suggest	  that	  the	  strict	  adherence	   to	   the	  consumer	  sovereignty	  principle	  was	  an	   interlude;	  and,	  second,	  we	  can	  infer	  that	  a	  ‘social	  point	  of	  view’	  endures	  through	  time.	  
	  
Figure	  2:	  Ngram	  –	  The	  resilience	  of	  merit	  wants	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When	   the	   concept	   of	   merit	   wants	   was	   coined,	   economists	   did	   not	   have	   the	  theoretical	  tools	  to	  grasp	  it.	  Musgrave	  advised	  them	  to	  look	  elsewhere,	  not	  unlike	  in	  the	  old	  joke	  about	  the	  economist	  trying	  to	  find	  his	  keys	  under	  the	  lamppost	  because	  it	  is	  the	  only	  place	  where	   there	   is	   light:	   “The	   general	   problem	  of	   optimal	   distribution,	   or	   that	   of	  merit	  wants,	  presents	  much	  greater	  difficulties.	  Thus	  it	  is	  proper	  for	  the	  economist	  to	  concentrate	  on	  the	  problem	  of	  social	  wants.	  Moreover,	   the	  phenomenon	  of	  pure	  merit	  wants	   is	  not	  so	  general	  as	   it	   seems	  at	   first	   sight”	   (Musgrave	  1959,	  89).	  As	   long	  as	  economists	   focused	  on	  questions	  of	  efficiency,	  the	  new	  welfare	  economics	  could	  provide	  a	  sophisticated	  theoretical	  framework.	  Musgrave	  tried	  to	  move	  redistribution	  matters	  aside	  in	  a	  politically	  determined	  distribution	  branch	  of	  his	  Theory	  of	  Public	  Finance.	  The	  allocation	  branch	  could	   then	   take	  care	   of	   social	   goods	   in	   line	   with	   individual	   preferences,	   thereby	   adhering	   to	   consumer	  sovereignty.	  Yet,	  redistribution	  in	  kind	  showed	  up	  like	  an	  unwelcome	  guest	  at	  a	  party.	  With	  hindsight,	  Musgrave	  became	  proud	  of	  his	  inconvenient	  concept:	  “the	  skeleton	  has	  remained	  in	  my	  closet	  and	  I	  am	  pleased	  to	  remain	  responsible	  for	  it”	  (Musgrave	  1983,	  3).	  Addressing	  equity	   issues	   was	   important	   for	   Musgrave,	   who	   wanted	   to	   build	   a	   comprehensive	   and	  useful	  normative	  theory	  of	  the	  public	  sector.	  To	  do	  so,	  Musgrave	  had	  to	  violate	  certain	  rules	  by	  combining	  elements	  of	  Old	  and	  New	  welfare	  economics.	  This	  path	  was	  also	  followed	  in	  the	  field	  of	  public	  economics	  which	  grew	  out	  of	  public	  finance	  in	  the	  early	  1970s	  (Mongin	  2006).	  For	  instance,	  interpersonal	  comparisons	  of	  well-­‐‑being	  were	  part	  of	  the	  Old	  welfare	  tradition	  (e.g.,	  Sidgwick,	  Pigou),	  just	  as	  they	  are	  now	  part	  of	  most	  substantial	  approaches	  to	  justice	  (Dowding	  2009).	  As	  Rawls	  put	  it	  in	  a	  lecture	  commenting	  on	  Cooter	  and	  Rappoport	  (1984):	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[T]here	   is	   nothing	   unusual	   in	   the	   use	   of	   primary	   goods	   as	   a	   basis	   of	   interpersonal	   comparisons.	   The	  
underlying	   idea	   resembles	   that	  of	  material	  welfare;	   and	   indeed	   that	  of	   any	  other	   view	   that	  would	  base	  
these	   comparisons	   on	   some	  normative	   conception	  of	   needs	   and	   requirements,	   or	   certain	   specified	   and	  
protected	   interests.	   Thus,	   it	   resembles	   Scanlon’s	   conception	   of	   urgency	   and	   Sen’s	   conception	   of	   basic	  
capabilities	  […]32	  In	   any	   case,	  welfare	  economics	  must	  posit	   a	  definition	  of	   social	  welfare.	  Musgrave	  coined	  the	  concept	  of	  merit	  wants	  to	  represent	  social	  judgments	  that	  are	  not	  easily	  reduced	  to	  individual	  valuations.	  One	  argumentative	  path	  has	  been	  to	  enrich	  the	  conception	  of	  the	  individual	   and	   that	   of	   the	   institutional	   setting	   in	   order	   to	   reestablish	   the	   individual	  welfare/social	  welfare	  link	  (section	  1).	  A	  second	  path	  has	  been	  to	  reject	  the	  reduction	  and	  maintain	  socially	  non-­‐‑reducible	  values	  (section	  2).	  The	  non-­‐‑individualistic	  SWF	  is	  a	  tool	  to	  represent	  various	  perspectives	  on	  this	  issue.	  By	  making	  explicit	  the	  social	  point	  of	  view,	  it	  permits	  a	  comparison	  with	  older	  conceptualizations	  of	  a	  social	  point	  of	  view,	  such	  as	  that	  taken	  by	  Musgrave	  in	  his	  dissertation	  before	  he	  coined	  the	  concept	  of	  merit	  goods	  (section	  3).	  This	  narrative	  brings	  out	  the	  persistence	  of	  a	  social,	  national,	  or	  collective	  point	  of	  view	  in	  economics.	  
The	  necessity	  of	  a	  social	  point	  of	  view	  for	  economic	  theory	   is	  an	  open	  question.	  At	  least,	   it	   seems	   inevitable	   in	   political	   discussions	   and	   surely	   represents	   a	   challenge	   for	  economists,	  as	  Clark	  (1936,	  44)	  acknowledged:	  	  
The	   search	   for	   standards	   of	   social	   value	   in	   the	   economic	   realm	   is	   a	   baffling	   task,	   yet	   far	   from	   an	  
unprofitable	  one.	  We	  shall	  presumably	  never	  discover	  a	  definite	  yardstick	  of	   social	   value	  comparable	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  John	  Rawls,	  “Philosophy	  273	  Primary	  goods	  and	  the	  concept	  of	  material	  welfare.”	  October	  17,	  1984.	  Papers	  of	  John	  Rawls.	  Harvard	  University	  Archives.	  Box	  37,	  Folder	  14.	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the	  dollar	  yardstick	  of	  exchange	  values;	  but	  we	  may	  find	  standards	  by	  which	  those	  of	  the	  market	  may	  be	  
revised,	  or	  in	  some	  instances	  replaced.	  	  By	  embodying	  a	  social	  perspective,	  the	  concept	  of	  merit	  goods	  can	  serve	  as	  an	  intermediary	  to	  help	  make	  public	  policy	  debates	  more	  rational	  and	  transparent.	  Participants	  in	  a	  debate	  benefit	  from	  having	  different	  categories	  to	  disentangle	  the	  issues	  at	  stake;	  externalities	  and	  public	  goods	  might	  not	  be	  sufficient.	  The	  content	  of	  the	  debates	  certainly	  changes	  over	  time	  and	  space.	   In	  the	  United	  States	  after	  World	  War	  II,	  progressive	  economists	  pointed	  to	  the	  deficiency	  of	   decent	  housing	   and	  nourishing	  meals	   for	   some	  parts	   of	   the	  population.	  The	  current	   discussions	   on	   the	   role	   of	   government	   in	   higher	   education	   funding,	   on	   universal	  health	   insurance,	   or	   that	   of	   taxing	   unhealthy	   soft	   drinks	   might	   also	   benefit	   from	   a	  conceptualization	  in	  terms	  of	  merit	  goods.	  
	  
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	  
Earlier	  versions	  of	   this	  paper	  were	  presented	  at	   the	  Summer	  School	   in	  History	  of	  Science	  and	   Economics	   in	   Montréal	   (July	   2015),	   at	   the	   GATE	   seminar	   in	   Saint-­‐‑Etienne	   (October	  2015),	   and	   at	   the	   AOH	   seminar	   in	   Paris	   (November	   2015).	   I	   am	   grateful	   to	   Antoinette	  Baujard,	  Annie	  Cot,	  Jérôme	  Lallement,	  Joseph	  Mazor,	  and	  Eric	  Brandstedt	  for	  their	  feedback.	  The	   paper	   has	   also	   benefited	   from	   the	   constructive	   criticism	   of	   the	   editor	   of	   this	   special	  issue,	  Stefan	  Mann,	  as	  well	  as	  from	  two	  anonymous	  referees.	  I	  am	  solely	  responsible	  for	  the	  remaining	  errors	  and	  disagreements.	  My	  visit	  to	  the	  LSE	  was	  made	  possible	  by	  a	  mobility	  grant	  from	  the	  Swiss	  National	  Science	  Foundation.	  	  
	   39	  
REFERENCES	  
	  Amadae,	  S.	  M.	  (2003).	  Rationalizing	  Capitalist	  Democracy.	  The	  Cold	  War	  Origins	  of	  Rational	  
Choice	  Liberalism.	  Chicago:	  The	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press.	  Andel,	   N.	   (1984).	   “Zum	  Konzept	   Der	  Meritorischen	   Güter.”	  FinanzArchiv	   /	   Public	   Finance	  
Analysis	  42	  (3),	  630–48.	  Arrow,	  K.	  J.	  (1951).	  Social	  Choice	  and	  Individual	  Values.	  New	  Haven:	  Yale	  University	  Press.	  Second	  Edition.	  Auld,	  D.	  A.	  L.,	  and	  P.	  C.	  Bing.	  (1971).	  “Merit	  Wants:	  A	  Further	  Analysis.”	  Finanzarchiv	  30	  (2),	  257–65.	  Backhouse,	   R.	   E.,	   and	   T.	   Nishizawa.	   (2010a).	   “Welfare	   Economics,	   Old	   and	   New.”	   In	   No	  
Wealth	  but	  Life,	  223–36.	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  ———,	  eds.	  (2010b).	  No	  Wealth	  but	  Life.	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  Baigent,	  N.	  (1981).	  “Social	  Choice	  and	  Merit	  Goods.”	  Economics	  Letters	  7	  (1),	  301–5.	  Ballentine,	  J.	  G.	  1972.	  “Merit	  Goods,	  Information,	  and	  Corrected	  Preferences.”	  Finanzarchiv	  31,	  298–306.	  Basu,	  K.	  (1976).	  “Retrospective	  Choice	  and	  Merit	  Goods.”	  Finanzarchiv	  35	  (2).	  Baujard,	  A.	  (2015a).	  “A	  History	  of	  Welfare	  Economics.”	  Working	  paper.	  mimeo.	  ———.	  (2015b).	  “Economic	  Science	  Vs.	  Welfare	  Economics.	  An	  Epistemological	  Reading	  of	  the	  History	  of	  Welfare	  Economics.”	  Working	  Paper.	  mimeo.	  Bergson,	   A.	   (1938).	   “A	   Reformulation	   of	   Certain	   Aspects	   of	   Welfare	   Economics.”	   The	  
Quarterly	  Journal	  of	  Economics	  52	  (2).	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  310–34.	  Besley,	  T.	  (1988).	  “A	  Simple	  Model	  for	  Merit	  Good	  Arguments.”	  Journal	  of	  Public	  Economics	  35,	  371–83.	  
	   40	  
Braulke,	  M.	  (1972).	  “Merit	  Goods:	  A	  Few	  Additional	  Comments.”	  In	  An	  Anthology	  Regarding	  
Merit	  Goods:	  The	  Unfinished	  Ethical	  Revolution	   in	  Economic	  Theory,	   edited	  by	  Wilfried	  Ver	  Eecke,	  2007,	  221–23.	  West	  Lafayette,	  Indiana:	  Purdue	  University	  Press.	  Brennan,	   G.	   and	   L.	   Lomasky.	   (1983).	   “Institutional	   Aspects	   of	   ‘Merit	   Goods’	   Analysis.”	  
Finanzarchiv	  41	  (2),	  183–206.	  Brennan,	   G.,	   and	   C.	   Walsh,	   eds.	   (1990).	   Rationality,	   Individualism,	   and	   Public	   Policy.	  Canberra:	   Centre	   for	   Research	   on	   Federal	   Financial	   Relations,	   The	   Australian	   National	  University.	  Buchanan,	   J.	  M.	  1960.	   “Review:	  The	  Theory	  of	  Public	  Finance.”	  Southern	  Economic	   Journal	  26,	  234–38.	  Burrows,	   P.	   (1977).	   “‘Efficient’	   Pricing	   and	   Government	   Interference.”	   In	   An	   Anthology	  
Regarding	   Merit	   Goods:	   The	   Unfinished	   Ethical	   Revolution	   in	   Economic	   Theory,	   edited	   by	  Wilfried	  Ver	  Eecke,	  2007,	  281–94.	  West	  Lafayette,	  Indiana:	  Purdue	  University	  Press.	  Clark,	  J.	  M.	  (1936).	  “Toward	  a	  concept	  of	  social	  value.”	  In	  Preface	  to	  Social	  Economics.	  Essays	  
on	  Economic	  Theory	  and	  social	  problems,	  44-­‐‑65.	  New	  York:	  Farrar	  &	  Rinehart.	  Clément,	   V.,	   N.	   Moureau,	   and	   M.	   Vidal.	   2009.	   “À	   la	   recherche	   des	   biens	   sous	   tutelle.”	  
L’Actualité	  économique,	  Revue	  d’analyse	  économique	  85(4),	  383-­‐‑401.	  Colm,	  G.	  (1960a).	  “In	  Defense	  of	  the	  Public	  Interest.”	  Social	  Research,	  27	  (1).	  ———.	  (1960b).	  “The	  Theory	  of	  Public	  Finance:	  A	  Study	  in	  Public	  Economy.	  By	  Richard	  A.	  Musgrave.”	  The	  Journal	  of	  Finance,	  15	  (1),	  118–20.	  ———.	  (1965).	  “National	  Goals	  Analysis	  and	  Marginal	  Utility	  Economics.”	  Finanzarchiv,	  24	  (2),	  209–24.	  Cooter,	   R.	   D.,	   and	   J.	   Gordley.	   (1995).	   “The	   Cultural	   Justification	   of	   Unearned	   Income:	   An	  Economic	   Model	   of	   Merit	   Goods	   Based	   on	   Aristotelian	   Ideas	   of	   Akrasia	   and	   Distributive	  Justice.”	   In	  Profits	  and	  Morality,	   edited	  by	  R.	  Cowan	  and	  M.	   J.	  Rizzo,	  150–74.	  Chicago:	  The	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press.	  
	   41	  
Cooter,	   R.	   D.,	   and	   P.	   Rappoport.	   (1984).	   “Were	   the	   Ordinalists	   Wrong	   About	   Welfare	  Economics?”	  Journal	  of	  Economic	  Literature,	  22	  (2),	  507–30.	  Culyer,	  A.	  J.	  (1971).	  “Merit	  Goods	  and	  the	  Welfare	  Economics	  of	  Coercion.”	  Public	  Finance	  /	  
Finances	  Publiques,	  26	  (1),	  546–72.	  Dasgupta,	  P.	  (2005).	  “What	  Do	  Economists	  Analyze	  and	  Why:	  Values	  or	  Facts?”	  Economics	  
and	  Philosophy,	  21	  (2),	  221–78.	  Davis,	  J.	  B.	  (1990).	  “Cooter	  and	  Rappoport	  on	  the	  Normative.”	  Economics	  and	  Philosophy,	  6	  (1):	  139–46.	  ———.	   (2006).	   “The	   Turn	   in	   Economics:	   Neoclassical	   Dominance	   to	   Mainstream	  Pluralism?”	  Journal	  of	  Institutional	  Economics,	  2	  (1),	  1-­‐‑20.	  ———.	   (2008).	   “The	   Turn	   in	   Recent	   Economics	   and	   Return	   of	   Orthodoxy.”	   Cambridge	  
Journal	  of	  Economics	  32	  (3),	  349–66.	  De	  Viti	  de	  Marco,	   A.	   (1934).	   First	   Principles	   of	   Public	   Finance.	   London:	   Jonathan	   Cape.	  English	  translation	  from	  1936.	  Desmarais-­‐‑Tremblay,	   M.	   (2014).	   “Normative	   and	   Positive	   Theories	   of	   Public	   Finance:	  Contrasting	  Musgrave	  and	  Buchanan.”	  Journal	  of	  Economic	  Methodology,	  21	  (3),	  273–89.	  ———.	  (2015a).	  “A	  Genealogy	  of	  the	  Concept	  of	  Merit	  Wants.”	  Forthcoming	  in	  2017	  in	  the	  
European	  Journal	  of	  the	  history	  of	  economic	  thought.	  ———.	  (2015b).	  “Musgrave,	  Samuelson,	  and	  the	  crystallization	  of	  the	  standard	  rationale	  for	  public	   goods.”	   Working	   Paper.	   Based	   on	   a	   previous	   paper	   from	   2013	   titled	   “On	   the	  definition	  of	  Public	  Goods.	  Assessing	  Richard	  A.	  Musgrave’s	  contribution.”	  Desreumaux,	  V.	  (2013).	  “Équilibre	  général	  et	  justice	  sociale	  :	  la	  théorie	  néoclassique	  comme	  philosophie	  politique ?”	  Cahiers	  d’économie	  Politique,	  1(64),	  75–110.	  
	   42	  
Dowding,	   K.	   (2009).	   “What	   Is	   Welfare	   and	   How	   Can	   We	   Measure	   It?”	   In	   The	   Oxford	  
Handbook	  of	  Philosophy	  of	  Economics,	  edited	  by	  H.	  Kinkaid	  and	  D.	  Ross,	  511–39.	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  D’amico,	   D.	   (2009).	   “Merit	   Goods,	   Paternalism	   and	   Responsibility.”	   In	   Public	   Choice	   E	  
Political	  Economy,	  24–25.	  Ege,	  R.,	  and	  H.	  Igersheim.	  (2010).	  “Rawls’s	  Justice	  Theory	  and	  Its	  Relations	  to	  the	  Concept	  of	  Merit	  Goods.”	  European	  Journal	  of	  the	  History	  of	  Economic	  Thought,	  17	  (4),	  1001–30.	  Erickson,	  P.,	  J.	  L.	  Klein,	  L.	  Daston,	  R.	  Lemov,	  T.	  Sturm,	  and	  M.	  D.	  Gordon.	  (2013).	  How	  Reason	  
Almost	  Lost	  Its	  Mind.	  The	  Strange	  Career	  of	  Cold	  War	  Rationality.	  Chicago:	  The	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press.	  Fiorito,	  R.,	  and	  Kollintzas,	  T.	  (2004).	  “Public	  goods,	  merit	  goods,	  and	  the	  relation	  between	  private	  and	  government	  consumption.”	  European	  Economic	  Review,	  48(6),	  1367–1398.	  Folkers,	  C.	  (1974).	  “Merit	  Goods:	  A	  Problem	  in	  the	  Normative	  Theory	  of	  Public	  Spending.”	  In	  
An	  Anthology	  Regarding	  Merit	  Goods:	  The	  Unfinished	  Ethical	  Revolution	  in	  Economic	  Theory,	  edited	   by	  Wilfried	   Ver	   Eecke,	   2007.	   253–80.	  West	   Lafayette,	   Indiana:	   Purdue	   University	  Press.	  Frankfurt,	  H.	  G.	  (1971).	  “Freedom	  of	  the	  Will	  and	  the	  Concept	  of	  a	  Person.”	  The	  Journal	  of	  
Philosophy,	  68	  (1),	  5–20.	  Friedman,	   M.	   (1953).	   “The	   Methodology	   of	   Positive	   Economics.”	   In	   Essays	   in	   Positive	  
Economics,	  3–43.	  Chicago:	  The	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press.	  Galbraith,	  J.	  K.	  (1958).	  The	  Affluent	  Society.	  Cambridge,	  MA:	  The	  Riverside	  Press.	  Grinberg,	  R.,	  and	  A.	  Rubinstein.	  (2005).	  Economic	  Socio-­‐‑Dynamic.	  Berlin:	  Springer.	  Habermas,	   J.	   (1990).	   Moral	   Consciousness	   and	   Communicative	   Action.	   Cambridge:	   Polity	  Press.	  
	   43	  
Harsanyi,	   J.	   C.	   (1955).	   “Cardinal	   Welfare,	   Individualistic	   Ethics,	   and	   Interpersonal	  Comparisons	  of	  Utility.”	  Journal	  of	  Political	  Economy,	  63	  (4),	  309–21.	  Hawi,	   R.	   (2011).	   “La	   Théorie	   de	   la	   justice	   de	   John	   Rawls	   à	   l’aune	   de	   l’économie:	   une	  reconstruction.”	  PhD	  thesis,	  Université	  Paris	  Ouest	  Nanterre	  La	  Défense.	  Head,	  J.	  G.	  (1966).	  “On	  Merit	  Goods.”	  Finanzarchiv,	  25	  (1),	  1–29.	  ———.	  (1969).	  “Merit	  Goods	  Revisited.”	  Finanzarchiv,	  28	  (2),	  214–25.	  ———.	  (1988).	  “On	  Merit	  Wants:	  Reflections	  on	  the	  Evolution,	  Normative	  Status	  and	  Policy	  Relevance	  of	  a	  Controversial	  Public	  Finance	  Concept.”	  Finanzarchiv,	  46,1–37.	  ———.	  (1991).	  “Merit	  Wants:	  Analysis	  and	  Taxonomy.”	  In	  Retrospectives	  on	  Public	  Finance,	  edited	  by	  L.	  Eden,	  229–52.	  Durham:	  Duke	  University	  Press.	  ———.	  (2009).	  “Introduction	  and	  Dedication.”	  In	  Tax	  Reform	  in	  the	  21st	  century.	  A	  Volume	  
in	   Memory	   of	   Richard	   Musgrave,	   edited	   by	   J.	   G.	   Head	   and	   R.	   Krever,	   xi–xiii.	   Kluwer	   Law	  International.	  Hegel,	  G.	  W.	  F.	  (1821).	  Elements	  of	  the	  Philosophy	  of	  Right.	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  1991.	  Translated	  by	  H.B.	  Nisbet	  and	  edited	  by	  A.	  W.	  Wood.	  Hochman,	  H.	  M.,	  and	   J.	  D.	  Rodgers.	   (1969).	   “Pareto	  Optimal	  Redistribution.”	  The	  American	  
Economic	  Review,	  59	  (4),	  542–57.	  Hutt,	  W.	  H.	  (1934).	  “Economic	  Method	  and	  the	  Concept	  of	  Competition.”	  The	  South	  African	  
Journal	  of	  Economics,	  2	  (1):	  1–23.	  ———.	  (1936).	  Economists	  and	  the	  Public.	  London:	  Jonathan	  Cape.	  ———.	  (1940).	  “The	  Concept	  of	  Consumers’	  Sovereignty.”	  The	  Economic	  Journal,	  50	  (197),	  66–77.	  Johansen,	  L.	  (1965).	  Public	  Economics.	  Amsterdam:	  North-­‐‑Holland.	  
	   44	  
Kirchgässner,	   G.	   (2015).	   “Soft	   paternalism,	   merit	   goods,	   and	   normative	   individualism.”	  
European	  Journal	  of	  Law	  and	  Economics,	  [online	  first].	  	  Mackscheidt,	   K.	   (1974).	   “Merit	   Goods:	   Musgrave’s	   Idea	   and	   Its	   Consequences.”	   In	   An	  
Anthology	   Regarding	   Merit	   Goods:	   The	   Unfinished	   Ethical	   Revolution	   in	   Economic	   Theory,	  edited	   by	  Wilfried	   Ver	   Eecke,	   2007,	   244–52.	  West	   Lafayette,	   Indiana:	   Purdue	   University	  Press.	  Mann,	  S.	  (2006).	  “Merit	  Goods	  in	  a	  Utilitarian	  Framework.”	  Review	  of	  Political	  Economy,	  18	  (4),	  509–20.	  Mann,	   S.,	   and	   M.	   Gairing.	   2012.	   “Does	   Libertarian	   Paternalism	   Reconcile	   Merit	   Goods	  Theory	  with	  Mainstream	  Economics?”	  Forum	  for	  Social	  Economics,	  41	  (2-­‐‑3),	  206–19.	  Mastromatteo,	   G.,	   and	   S.	   Solari.	   (2014).	   “The	   Idea	   of	   ‘Common	  Good’	   and	   the	  Role	   of	   the	  State	   in	   Present	   Day	   Social	   Economics.”	  Rivista	   Internazionale	   Di	   Scienze	   Sociali,	   124	   (1),	  85–102.	  Mazzola,	  U.	  (1890).	  “The	  Formation	  of	  the	  Prices	  of	  Public	  Goods.”	  In	  Classics	  in	  the	  Theory	  
of	  Public	  Finance,	  edited	  by	  R.	  A.	  Musgrave	  and	  A.	  T.	  Peacock,	  37–47.	  London:	  Macmillan	  &	  Co.	  1958.	  McLure,	   C.	  E.	  Jr.	   (1968).	   “Merit	   Wants:	   A	   Normatively	   Empty	   Box.”	   Finanzarchiv	   27	   (3):	  474–83.	  McLure,	  C.	  E.	  Jr.	  (1990).	  “Merit	  Wants.”	  In	  Rationality,	  Individualism,	  and	  Public	  Policy,	  edited	  by	  G.	  Brennan	  and	  C.	  Walsh,	  178–85.	  Canberra:	  Centre	   for	  Research	  on	  Federal	  Financial	  Relations.	  Mongin,	   P.	   (2006).	   “A	   Concept	   of	   Progress	   for	   Normative	   Economics.”	   Economics	   and	  
Philosophy,	  22	  (01),	  19–54.	  Munro,	   A.	   (2009).	   Bounded	   Rationality	   and	   Public	   Policy:	   A	   Perspective	   from	   Behavioural	  
Economics.	  Springer.	  
	   45	  
Musgrave,	   R.	  A.	   (1937).	   The	   Theory	   of	   Public	   Finance	   and	   the	   Concept	   of	   “Burden	   of	  
Taxation”.	  PhD	  dissertation,	  Harvard	  University.	  ———.	  (1957).	  “A	  Multiple	  Theory	  of	  Budget	  Determination.”	  Finanzarchiv,	  17	  (3),	  333–43.	  ———.	  (1959).	  The	  Theory	  of	  Public	  Finance:	  A	  Study	  in	  Public	  Economy.	  New	  York:	  McGraw	  Hill.	  ———.	   (1969a).	   “Provision	   for	   Social	   Goods.”	   In	   Public	   Economics:	   An	   Analysis	   of	   Public	  
Production	  and	  Consumption	  and	  Their	  Relations	  to	  the	  Private	  Sectors.,	  edited	  by	  J.	  Margolis	  and	  H.	  Guitton,	  124–44.	  London:	  Macmillan.	  ———.	   (1969b).	   “Cost-­‐‑Benefit	   Analysis	   and	   the	   Theory	   of	   Public	   Finance.”	   Journal	   of	  
Economic	  Literature,	  7(3),	  797-­‐‑806.	  ———.	  (1970).	  “Pareto	  Optimal	  Redistribution:	  Comment.”	  The	  American	  Economic	  Review,	  60	  (5):	  991–93.	  ———.	  (1983).	  “Public	  Finance,	  Now	  and	  Then.”	  Finanzarchiv,	  41	  (1),	  1–13.	  ———.	   (1987).	   “Merit	   Goods.”	   In	  The	  New	  Palgrave	  Dictionary	   of	   Economics,	   edited	   by	   J.	  Eatwell,	  M.	  Milgate,	  and	  P.	  Newman,	  first	  edition,	  1958–60.	  Palgrave.	  ———.	   (1997).	   “Crossing	   Traditions.”	   In	   Zur	   deutschsprachigen	  
wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen	   Emigration	   nach	   1933,	   edited	   by	   H.	   Hagemann,	   63-­‐‑79.	  Marburg:	  Metropolis-­‐‑Verlag.	  ———.	   (1999).	   “Fiscal	   Federalism.”	   In	  Public	   Finance	   and	   Public	   Choice:	   Two	   Contrasting	  
Visions	   of	   the	   State,	   by	   J.	  M.	   Buchanan	   and	  R.	   A.	  Musgrave,	   155–75.	   Cambridge,	  MA:	  MIT	  Press/	  CESifo.	  Musgrave,	  P.	  B.	  (2008).	  “Comments	  on	  two	  Musgravian	  concepts.”	  Journal	  of	  Economics	  and	  
Finance,	  32(4),	  340-­‐‑347.	  Nussbaum,	   M.	   C.	   (2000).	   Women	   and	   Human	   Development:	   The	   Capabilities	   Approach.	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  
	   46	  
Pauly,	  M.	  V.	  (1970).	  “Efficiency	  in	  the	  Provision	  of	  Consumption	  Subsidies.”	  Kyklos,	  23	  (1):	  33–57.	  Pazner,	  E.	  A.	  (1972).	  “Merit	  Wants	  And	  The	  Theory	  of	  Taxation.”	  Public	  Finance	  /	  Finances	  
Publiques,	  27	  (4):	  460–72.	  Pigou,	  A.	  C.	  (1932).	  The	  Economics	  of	  Welfare.	  London:	  Macmillan.	  4th	  edition.	  Pulsipher,	   A.	   G.	   (1971).	   “The	   Properties	   and	  Relevancy	   of	  Merit	   Goods.”	  Finanzarchiv,	   30	  (2):	  266–86.	  Racionero,	   M.	   (2000).	   “Optimal	   Redistribution	   with	   Unobservable	   Preferences	   for	   an	  Observable	  Merit	  Good.”	  International	  Tax	  and	  Public	  Finance,	  7,	  479–501.	  Rawls,	  J.	  (1971).	  A	  Theory	  of	  Justice.	  Cambridge,	  MA:	  Harvard	  University	  Press.	  ———.	  (1982).	  “Social	  Unity	  and	  Primary	  Goods.”	  In	  Utilitarianism	  and	  Beyond,	  edited	  by	  A.	  Sen	  and	  B.	  Williams,	  158–85.	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  ———.	  (2001).	  Justice	  as	  Fairness.	  A	  Restatement.	  Cambridge:	  Harvard	  University	  Press.	  Ritschl,	  H.	  (1931).	  “Communal	  Economy	  and	  Market	  Economy.”	  In	  Classics	  in	  the	  Theory	  of	  
Public	   Finance,	   edited	   by	   Richard	   A.	   Musgrave	   and	   Alan	   T.	   Peacock,	   233–42.	   London:	  Macmillan.	  Robbins,	   L.	   (1932).	   An	   Essay	   on	   the	   Nature	   &	   Significance	   of	   Economic	   Science.	   London:	  Macmillan.	  Roskamp,	  K.	  W.	   (1975).	   “Public	  Goods,	  Merit	  Goods,	  Private	  Goods,	  Pareto	  Optimum,	   and	  Social	  Optimum.”	  Public	  Finance	  /	  Finances	  Publiques,	  30	  (1),	  61–69.	  Rüffer,	  C.	  (2007).	  Merit	  Goods	  Determined	  by	  Society	  Value	  Judgments	  -­‐‑	  Political	  Implications	  
for	   Public	   Participation.	   Support	   from	   an	   Empirical	   Analysis	   Concerning	   Environmental	  
Goods.	  Stuttgart:	  Ibidem.	  Samuelson,	   P.	   A.	   (1947).	   Foundations	   of	   Economic	   Analysis.	   Cambridge,	   MA:	   Harvard	  University	  Press.	  
	   47	  
———.	   (1954).	   “The	   Pure	   Theory	   of	   Public	   Expenditure.”	   The	   Review	   of	   Economics	   and	  
Statistics,	  36	  (4),	  387–89.	  Sandel,	   M.	   J.	   (1996).	   Democracy’s	   Discontent.	   America	   in	   Search	   of	   a	   Public	   Philosophy.	  Cambridge,	  MA:	  Harvard	  University	  Press.	  Sandmo,	  A.	  (1983).	  “Ex	  Post	  Welfare	  Economics	  and	  the	  Theory	  of	  Merit	  Goods.”	  Economica,	  50	  (197):	  19.	  Sen,	   A.	   (1977).	   “Rational	   Fools:	   A	   Critique	   of	   the	   Behavioral	   Foundations	   of	   Economic	  Theory.”	  Philosophy	  and	  Public	  Affairs,	  6	  (4),	  317–44.	  ———.	  (1979).	   “Personal	  Utilities	  and	  Public	   Judgements:	  Or	  What’s	  Wrong	  with	  Welfare	  Economics.”	  The	  Economic	  Journal,	  89	  (355),	  537–58.	  Sturn,	  R.	  (2015).	  “The	  Merits	  of	  Merit	  Wants.”	  In	  Individual	  and	  Collective	  Choice	  and	  Social	  
Welfare:	  Essays	  in	  Honor	  of	  Nick	  Baigent,	  edited	  by	  C.	  Binder,	  G.	  Codognato,	  M.	  Teschl,	  and	  Y.	  Xu,	  289–308.	  Heidelberg:	  Springer.	  Sunstein,	  C.	  R.,	  and	  R.	  H.	  Thaler.	  (2003).	  “Libertarian	  Paternalism	  Is	  Not	  an	  Oxymoron.”	  The	  
University	  of	  Chicago	  Law	  Review,	  70	  (4),	  1159.	  Taylor,	  C.	   (1982).	   “The	  Diversity	  of	  Goods.”	   In	  Utilitarianism	  and	  Beyond,	  edited	  by	  A.	  Sen	  and	  B.	  Williams,	  129–44.	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  ———.	   (1990).	   “Irreducibly	  Social	  Goods.”	   In	  Rationality,	   Individualism,	  and	  Public	  Policy,	  edited	   by	   G.	   Brennan	   and	   C.	   Walsh,	   45–63.	   Canberra:	   Centre	   for	   Research	   on	   Federal	  Financial	  Relations.	  Thaler,	   R.	   H.,	   and	   C.	   R.	   Sunstein.	   (2003).	   “Libertarian	   Paternalism.”	   American	   Economic	  
Review,	  93	  (2),	  175–79.	  Tiebout,	   C.	   M.,	   and	   D.	   B.	   Houston.	   (1962).	   “Metropolitan	   Finance	   Reconsidered:	   Budget	  Functions	   and	  Multi-­‐‑Level	   Governments.”	  The	   Review	   of	   Economics	   and	   Statistics,	   44	   (4),	  412–17.	  
	   48	  
Tobin,	  J.	  (1970).	  “On	  Limiting	  the	  Domain	  of	  Inequality.”	  Journal	  of	  Law	  and	  Economics,	  13,	  263–77.	  Ver	  Eecke,	  W.	   (1998).	   “The	  Concept	  of	  a	   ‘Merit	  Good’	  The	  Ethical	  Dimension	   in	  Economic	  Theory	   and	   the	   History	   of	   Economic	   Thought	   or	   the	   Transformation	   of	   Economics	   into	  Socio-­‐‑Economics.”	  Journal	  of	  Socio-­‐‑Economics,	  27	  (1),	  133–53.	  ———.	  (1999).	  “Public	  Goods:	  An	  Ideal	  Concept.”	  Journal	  of	  Socio-­‐‑Economics,	  28	  (2),	  139–56.	  ———.	   (2003).	   “Adam	   Smith	   and	   Musgrave’s	   Concept	   of	   Merit	   Good.”	   Journal	   of	   Socio-­‐‑
Economics,	  31	  (6),	  701–20.	  ———,	  ed.	  (2007).	  An	  Anthology	  Regarding	  Merit	  Goods:	  The	  Unfinished	  Ethical	  Revolution	  
in	  Economic	  Theory.	  West	  Lafayette,	  Indiana:	  Purdue	  University	  Press.	  ———.	  (2008).	  Ethical	  Dimensions	  of	  the	  Economy:	  Making	  Use	  of	  Hegel	  and	  the	  Concepts	  of	  
Public	  and	  Merit	  Goods.	  Berlin:	  Springer-­‐‑Verlag.	  ———.	  (2013).	  Ethical	  Reflections	  on	  the	  Financial	  Crisis	  2007/2008:	  Making	  Use	  of	  Smith,	  
Musgrave	  and	  Rajan.	  Heidelberg:	  Springer-­‐‑Verlag.	  Walsh,	   C.	   (1987).	   “Individual	   Irrationality	   and	   Public	   Policy:	   In	   Search	   of	   Merit/Demerit	  Policies.”	  Journal	  of	  Public	  Policy	  7	  (2),	  103–34.	  Wiseman,	  J.	  (1960).	  “The	  Public	  Economy.”	  Economica,	  27(107),	  258-­‐‑270.	  
